Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State 45 UCLA Law Review 1997-1998

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45 UCLA L. Rev. 1 (1997-1998)
Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State

handle is hein.journals/uclalr45 and id is 15 raw text is: COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE IN THE
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
Jody Freeman
INTRODUCTION: REGULATORY REFORM ................................................................... 3
I. COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE ....................................................................... 8
A . T he C ritique .............................................................................................. 8
1. Rule M aking ..................................................................................... 10
2. Implementation and Enforcement .................................................... 14
B. Interest Representation .............................................................................. 18
C. Civic Republican Administrative Law ...................................................... 19
D. A Normative Model of Collaboration ...................................................... 21
1. Problem Solving ................................................................................ 22
2. Participation ..................................................................................... 27
3. Provisional Solutions .......................................................................... 28
4. Accountability That Transcends the Public-Private Divide ............. 30
5. A Flexible, Engaged Agency ............................................................. 31
II. ILLUSTRATIONS OF COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE ....................................... 33
A . N egotiated Rule M aking ............................................................................ 33
1. Equipment Leaks Negotiated Rule Making ...................................... 41
2. Fall Protection Negotiated Rule Making .......................................... 49
B. Project X L ................................................................................................. 55
1. Berry Corporation XL Agreement .................................................... 57
2. Intel Corporation XL Agreement ...................................................... 61
III. THE LIMITS OF THE NEW PROCESSES .............................................................. 66
A . Lim ited Scope ............................................................................................ 67
B. Bargains, Trades, and One-Time Deals ................................................... 69
C. Lack of Institutional Incentives for Experimentation ............................... 73
D. Limited Participation by Public Interest and Community Groups ....... 77
IV. THE PURSUIT OF COLLABORATION ................................................................. 82
* Acting Professor of Law, University of California, Los Angeles (freeman@law.
ucla.edu). This research was funded in part by the Academic Senate at UCLA. I am grateful to
the following colleagues for so generously offering comments and criticism: Martha Minow,
Chuck Sabel, Susan Sturm, Michael Asimow, Jerry Lopez, Stephen Yeazell, Clyde Spillenger,
Tom Sargentich, Mark Seidenfeld, Dan Lowenstein, Rick Abel, Joel Handler, Ken Karst, Gary
Schwartz, Ann Carlson, Lucie White, Eric Orts, Jane Schacter, Steve Munzer, John Applegate,
Lisa E. Krakow, participants in the Berkeley Third Space Workshop, and the Junior Faculty
Group at UCLA School of Law. I am indebted to many EPA officials and representatives of
public interest groups and industry, who consented to be interviewed and assisted me in com-
piling data. Douglas Carstens and Ethan Walsh provided excellent research assistance. All
errors and omissions are mine alone.