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107 Nw. U. L. Rev. 731 (2012-2013)
One-to-One Speech vs. One-to-Many Speech, Criminal Harassment Laws, and Cyberstalking

handle is hein.journals/illlr107 and id is 739 raw text is: Copyright 2013 by Northwestern University School of Law  Printed in U.S.A.
Northwestern University Law Review                       Vol. 107, No. 2
ONE-TO-ONE SPEECH VS. ONE-TO-MANY SPEECH,
CRIMINAL HARASSMENT LAWS,
AND CYBERSTALKING
Eugene Volokh
ABSTRACT-Until recently, criminal harassment usually referred to
telephone harassment-unwanted communications to a particular person.
Likewise, stalking laws were originally created to deal with people who
were physically following a person or trying to talk to that person. The
same has historically been true with regard to restraining orders.
But in recent years, these laws have been increasingly reworded or
interpreted in ways that also cover speech about a person, even when that
speech is communicated to potentially willing listeners. The law is in effect
returning to an era when criminal libel laws could impose liability not just
for falsehoods, but also for true statements or opinions that were
supposedly not said with good motives.
This Article will argue that this approach is unconstitutional when
applied to speech said about the target rather than just to the target, at least
when the speech is outside the traditional First Amendment exceptions
(chiefly threats and fighting words, plus perhaps libel). Courts should
therefore reject the application of these laws to such one-to-many speech,
and legislatures should resist the broadening of such laws.
AUTHOR-Gary T. Schwartz Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law
(volokh@law.ucla.edu). Thanks to Stuart Banner, Paul Bergman, Dan
Bussel, Robert Goldstein, Mark Grady, Carole Heyward, Bill Klein,
Maximo Langer, Bill McGovern, Seana Shiffrin, Alexander Stremitzer,
Jonathan Varat, and Steve Yeazell for their help.
I'm delighted to have been invited to participate in this Festschrift
honoring Marty Redish, whose theoretical and doctrinal First Amendment
work I have long admired. Having little to add to Marty's important
contributions on the particular subjects that he has confronted, and little to
say in disagreement with them, I thought I'd follow another Festschrift
tradition by writing an article in Marty's honor and in Marty's field,
inspired by the high standards that he has set.

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