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29 Berkeley J. Int'l L. 246 (2011)
Hyper-Presidentialism: Separation of Powers without Checks and Balances in Argentina and Philippines

handle is hein.journals/berkjintlw29 and id is 248 raw text is: Hyper-Presidentialism: Separation of Powers without Checks and Balances in Argentina and the Philippines By Susan Rose-Ackerman* Diane A. Desierto** Natalia Volosin*** INTRODUCTION Politicians have an incentive to enhance their power by creating institutions that give them greater freedom to act and by undermining institutions designed to check their influence. Presidents are particularly likely to test the limits of their power. Legislators must compromise in order to pass statutes.I Judges are aware that the executive or the legislature may refuse to comply with their rulings. An independently elected President, in contrast, can sometimes act without seeking legislative approval or provoking judicial constraints. Although Presidents are generally subject to impeachment, this is almost always an extraordinary remedy invoked only in response to a crisis.2 * Susan Rose-Ackerman is the Henry R. Luce Professor of Law and Political Science, Yale University. ** Diane Desierto holds an LLM from Yale Law School and is a Law Reform Specialist and Professorial Lecturer at the University of the Philippines. * Natalia Volosin holds an LLM from Yale Law School and is an attorney in Buenos Aires. 1. Even in a pure parliamentary system with strong party discipline, party leaders must negotiate with backbenchers over policy. The possibility of a vote of no confidence or of an internal party revolt limits their freedom of action. 2. See, e.g., Juan J. Linz, The Perils of Presidentialism, 1 J. DEMOCRACY 51 (1990) [hereafter Perils]. But see Donald L. Horowitz, Comparing Democratic Systems, I J. DEMOCRACY 73 (1990) (responding to Perils), and Seymour Martin Lipset, The Centrality of Political Culture, I J. DEMOCRACY 80 (1990) (responding to Perils). See also Juan J. Linz, The Virtues of Parliamentariism, 1 J. DEMOCRACY 84 (1990) (responding to Horowitz and Lipset); THE FAILURE OF PRESIDENTIAL DEMCRACY: VOL 1: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVEs and VOL II: THE CASE OF LATIN AMERICA (Juan J. Linz & Arturo Valenzuela eds., 1994); ROBERT A. DAHL, How 246