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48 Ark. L. Rev. 23 (1995)
Some Normative Agruments for the Unitary Executive

handle is hein.journals/arklr48 and id is 33 raw text is: Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive Steven G. Calabresi* TABLE OF CONTENTS I. Introduction .................................... 24 II. The Framers' Reasons for Creating a Strong and Unitary Executive ......................... 37 A . E nergy ..................................... 37 B. Accountability .............................. 42 C. Separation of Powers ....................... 45 III. Why Executive Unitariness is as Important as Strength: A Modernist Case ..................... 48 A. The Threat Posed By the Quasi- Parliamentary Executive of the Congressional Committee System ......... 50 B. The Threat Posed By the Tenured and Unaccountable Article III Executive of the Federal Courts and the Public Interest B ar ......................................... 55 C. The President and his Subordinates: The Only Representatives of a National Electoral Constituency ..................... 58 IV. Implications of My Normative Analysis For the Proper Scope of Presidential Power ....... 71 A. Lawmaking ................................. 71 * Associate Professor, Northwestern University School of Law. This article has benefitted from, and has been influenced by, my supervision of Catherine M. Valerio-Barrad's senior research paper at Northwestern. I am also grateful for the helpful suggestions and comments of Thomas W. Merrill, Akhil Reed Amar, Harold H. Bruff, Anthony D'Amato, Walter E. Dellinger III, Keith Hylton, Mark Kil- lenbeck, Gary Lawson, Geoffrey P. Miller, Bernard Nussbaum, Lee Liberman Otis, Daniel Polsby, Martin H. Redish, Peter M. Shane, Leonard P. Strickman, Cass R. Sunstein, and Mary S. Tyler. Finally, I benefitted greatly from presenting an earlier version of this article at the University of Arkansas in Fayetteville, Arkansas, during the Leflar Law Center's symposium on the Law of the Presidency held April 14-15, 1994. My observations herein are based on that earlier draft, and I have not revised my use of examples to take account of the change in party control of Congress stem- ming from the 1994 election.