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11 Wake Forest L. Rev. Online 131 (2021)
Built to Fail: The Inherent Fragility of Algorithmic Stablecoins

handle is hein.journals/wflron11 and id is 132 raw text is: BUILT TO FAIL: THE INHERENT FRAGILITY OF
ALGORITHMIC STABLECOINS
Dr. Ryan Clements*
Algorithmic stablecoins are inherently fragile. These
uncollateralized digital assets, which attempt to peg the price
of a reference asset using financial engineering, algorithms,
and market incentives, are not stable at all but exist in a state
of perpetual vulnerability. Iterations to date have struggled
to  maintain    a  stable  peg,   and   some   have   failed
catastrophically. This Article argues that algorithmic
stablecoins are fundamentally flawed because they rely on
three factors which history has shown to be impossible to
control. First, they require a support level of demand for
operational stability. Second, they rely on independent actors
with market incentives to perform price-stabilizing arbitrage.
Finally, they require reliable price information at all times.
None of these factors are certain, and all of them have proven
to be historically tenuous in the context of financial crises or
periods of extreme volatility. Regulatory guidelines are
needed for all stablecoin forms, including issuer registration
requirements,   a   defined   taxonomy    clarifying  forms,
prudential, collateral custody, and transparency safeguards,
and risk disclosure and containment measures. A strong
regulatory framework, with risk disclosure and containment
safeguards,   is  particularly   needed    for   algorithmic
stablecoins, which currently serve only speculative DeFi
trading applications and have very little, if any, societal or
financial inclusionary value.
INTRODUCTION
Financial product innovation is not always a good thing, and
certain innovations are designed in a way to make them inherently
unstable. In 2008, the entire financial system nearly collapsed due to
a dizzying array of complex securitization-driven, derivatives-
enhanced financial product innovations, which emanated from home

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* Dr. Ryan Clements, SJD (Duke) is an Assistant Professor, Chair in
Business Law and Regulation at the University of Calgary Faculty of Law and a
nonresident fellow of the Duke Global Financial Markets Center.