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60 U.S. Att'ys Bull. 46 (2012)
Carjacking

handle is hein.journals/usab60 and id is 47 raw text is: Carjacking Julie Wuslich Attorney Organized Crime and Gang Section Criminal Division I. Introduction In September 1992, two men forced Pamela Basu out of her car while she was idling at a stop sign not far from her home in Savage, Maryland. As they began to drive away, Basu attempted to rescue her 22-month-old daughter from the backseat of the car when her arm became entangled in the seat belt. Unconcerned, the assailants sped away and dragged Basu to her death. Within months of her killing, Congress enacted the carjacking statute, The Anti Car Theft Act of 1992, 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1996), to punish and deter such violent car thefts. See H.R. REP. No. 102-85 1, at 18 (1992) (In [an armed carjacking], two or three criminals approach a car waiting at a traffic light ... and force the driver to turn over the keys at gunpoint.); Holloway v. United States, 526 U.S. 1, 9 (1999) (Section 2119 reflects congressional intent to authorize federal prosecutions as a significant deterrent to a type of criminal activity that was a matter of national concern.). Congress, therefore, appears to have sought to criminalize a specific type of violent car theft when it enacted § 2119. Irrespective of congressional intent, the government has invoked the carjacking statute to punish not just the Basu-type of car theft but also an array of violent crimes involving a vehicle being taken or commandeered. In many cases the government has prevailed, but in a few noted exceptions mentioned below, it has not. The government's success has been due to the courts' generous interpretation of the statute and an expansive and distinguished reading of Holloway, further discussed below, which reinforced the statute's purpose by characterizing carjacking as a discreet criminal event. This article summarizes Holloway, the cases interpreting it, and other court opinions that have read the carjacking statute broadly, and what implications these decisions may have regarding venue. First, however, the article begins with a brief overview of the statute and a discussion of another important Supreme Court case concerning the structure of § 2119. II. Overview of § 2119 As originally passed in 1992, the carjacking law required the use of a firearm to effect the theft of a vehicle. In 1994, however, Congress passed the Violent and Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994), eliminating the firearm requirement and adding a specific intent element to the law. Two years later, the Carjacking Correction Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1996), added sexual abuse to the statute's definition of serious bodily injury. The carjacking statute now reads, in pertinent part: Whoever, with the intent to cause death or serious bodily harm takes a motor vehicle that has been transported, shipped, or received in interstate or foreign commerce from the person or presence of another by force and violence or by intimidation, or attempts to do so, shall- (1) be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS BULLETIN 46 JANUARY 2012