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6 J.L. & Educ. 3 (1977)
Social Sciences and Constitutional Rights - The Consequences of Uncertainty

handle is hein.journals/jle6 and id is 13 raw text is: Social Sciences and Constitutional
Rights -the Consequences of
Uncertainty
RONALD DWORKIN*
One question is central to the issue raised by the interrelationship of
education, social science and the courts' process. Certain decisions by the
federal courts, including the Supreme Court, require positive steps to be
taken towards school integration, using strategies that include busing. There
is a widespread belief that these decisions rest on certain propositions that
may either be confirmed or disconfirmed by what is called the social sciences.
The problem is this: these various propositions now appear to be more
doubtful than they were several years ago. This doubt raises two questions.
The first is: does this suggest that the judicial decisions were in fact wrong?
Must any doubt we might have about these propositions of social science be
translated into doubts about the soundness of the decisions that ordered
integration? The second question-parasitic on the first, is this - suppose we
decided that that is so. The doubts about these propositions must be trans-
lated into doubts about the decisions. Can we, or should we, draw any general
lesson about the use of such propositions in the ajudicative process generally?
Should we conclude that if we have gotten our hands burnt in using social
science in adjudication then we ought to stay away from that kind of fire in
the future? These seem to be the two questions central to this conference.
But first a distinction needs to be drawn. It might be a mistake, and it
might indeed retard our analysis, if we continue to assume that there is some
methodological technique that is practiced in common between, let us say,
economics on the one hand, and anthropology or history on the other. Much
has been written about the philosophy of the social sciences, and a distinction
is frequently made in that literature between two kinds of judgments or
hypotheses both of which belong to the social sciences in the sense that they
are made by people who profess to be a member of some discipline called a
social science. Causal judgments are judgments that assert a causal connec-
tion between two independently specifiable social phenomena. A very good
example can be drawn from economics: An economist says Allowing unem-
ployment to rise will decrease the rate of inflation. This is a prediction that
assumes a causal connection between two phenomena-the rate of unemploy-
ment and the rate of inflation. An interpretative judgment, on the other
hand, does not, at least not on the surface, assert a causal relationship
* Professor of Law, Oxford University, Oxford, England.