About | HeinOnline Law Journal Library | HeinOnline Law Journal Library | HeinOnline



97 Yale L.J. 1233 (1987-1988)
The Structure of Tort Law

handle is hein.journals/ylr97 and id is 1251 raw text is: Book Review
The Structure of Tort Law
The Economic Structure of Tort Law. By William Landes* and Richard
A. Posner.** Harvard University Press, 1987. Pp.ix, 329. $27.50
Economic Analysis of Accident Law. By Steven Shavell.*** Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 1987. Pp. xii, 312. $30.00
Jules L. Colemant
The economic analysis of tort law, like the economic analysis of law
generally, has both positive and normative dimensions.' Positive economic
analysis seeks to explain tort law by rationally reconstructing it: in other
words, by demonstrating how and to what extent existing doctrines fur-
ther economic efficiency. Normative economic analysis can be understood
as making either of two claims. In its modest version, normative economic
analysis makes a conditional claim: if the (or a) desirable goal of tort law
is to promote economic efficiency, then the rules of liability ought to be
such and such. In its ambitious version, normative economic analysis
drops the conditional, turning the hypothetical into a categorical impera-
tive: The rules of liability ought to be such and such.
All forms of the economic analysis of torts require specifying a model
from which one can derive the efficiency of various kinds of liability rules
* Clifton R. Musser Professor of Economics, University of Chicago.
** United States Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
*** Professor of Law and Economics, Harvard Law School.
t Professor of Law, Yale Law School. Ph.D. Rockefeller University 1972, M.S.L. Yale Law
School, 1976. I would like to thank Roberta Romano, Alan Schwartz, and David Bernstein for their
helpful suggestions.
1. For an example of the positive dimension of tort law, see Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J.
LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972). For the normative, see generally G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCI-
DENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970).

1233