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7 Eur. J. Risk Reg. 4 (2016)
Volkswagen: Bugs and Outlooks in Car Industry Regulation, Governance and Liability

handle is hein.journals/ejrr2016 and id is 12 raw text is: 



4    | Mini-Symposium   on the VW  Scandal


Volkswagen: Bugs and Outlooks in Car

Industry Regulation, Governance and Liability

        Marie-Eve  Arbour*


1. Introduction

The  scandal involving the Volkswagen   group  broke
out last Fall, at the dawn of the very delicate UN Con-
ference on Climate Change  (COP21)  held in Paris, and
the posting of an unofficial version of the Compre-
hensive  Economic   and  Trade  Agreement   (CETA)1.
This  so, just when  a leaked  version  Transatlantic
Trade   and   Investment   Partnership   (TTIP)  ran
through  the veins of the Internet2 and the Trans-Pa-
cific Partnership (TPP)3 was just about to be signed
in New   Zealand,  fostering market   integration by
pushing   further  national  treatment  and   mutual
recognition, against the backdrop   -albeit one small
step at a time- of an increasing demand  for environ-
mental  protection through  the setting, among  other
regulation  tools, of emission  thresholds4. Almost
ironically, indeed, the Volkswagen scandal raises very
serious conformity  assessment  loopholes, just when
a blowing  wind in international trade seeks to reach
out for greater uniformity and mutual  recognition of
regulatory procedures,  knowing,  too, that car indus-
try lobbyists  are  important   players  in defining
thresholds.
   Most importantly  and  even before entering court-
rooms,  the scandal also illustrates the impossibility




    Universit6 Laval, Quebec (Canada). This special endeavour
    surrounding VW is also the product of peer-reviewers, who
    revised around the world the present pieces within extremely
    short delays. Their comments and availability was most appreciat-
    ed as the Number could not have been rapidly out without their
    exceptional contribution. Translated and adapted, my own piece
    builds upon Volkswagen, le commerce et les seuils GES: la
    regulation des produits mise a mal, Repbres, Jan. 2016,
    EYB201 6REP1 843.
1   Canada and European Union (EU) Comprehensive Economic and
    Trade Agreement, signed on Sept. 26th 2014 [ CETA ], whose
    Chapter XX on Technical Barriers to Trade provides for greater
    cooperation in the field or Motor Vehicle Regulation, in order
     ...to strengthen cooperation and communication, including the
    exchange of information on motor vehicle safety and environmen-
    tal performance research activities linked to the development of
    new technical regulations or related standards, to promote the
    application and recognition of Global Technical Regulations
    under the framework of the 1998 Global Agreement administered
    by the WP29 and possible future harmonization, between the
    Parties, concerning improvements and other developments in the


of greenhouse  gas  (GHG)  reduction if corporate so-
cial responsibility is not taken seriously, given that
actual regulation techniques and  assessment  confor
mity  procedures  move  away  from  the outdated  do-
mestic command-and-control paradigm. Albeit to dif
ferent extents in North America   and the EU, for ex-
ample,  many   features of industries' self-regulation
are central to an effective protection of thresholds.
As a corollary and unless research and  development
(R&D)  enables domestic  or supranational  regulators
to crosscheck  industries' home  testing, conformity
assessment  procedures  are destined to remain an in-
adequate  regulation tool. From  a legal perspective,
what  can be learned from  VW's   debacle? The  ques-
tions invite to a kaleidoscopic answer,  considering
that is touches  upon  many   legal disciplines: be it
trade law, business law, consumer  law, criminal law,
environmental   law or liability law. Having in mind
to bringing up a useful mapping  for future research,
the present EJRR  number  gathers different, yet com-
plementary,  short opinion  pieces against the  back-
drop of the VW   scandal.
   In the absence of courts' judgements  that usually
underlie most  legal reasoning, lawyers generally hes-
itate to comment  on contemporary   events. Nonethe-
less, the scandal has so far inspired authoritative au-


    areas of motor vehicle technical regulations or related stan-
    dards : Annex, art. 1 (emphasis added).
2   The TTIP specifically addresses motor vehicle regulatory issues
    see EUROPEAN COMMISSION,  The Transatlantic Trade and
    Investment Partnership (TTIP) Regulatory Issues - EU position on
    motor vehicles, May 2014, online at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/
    doclib/docs/2014/may/tradoc_ 52467.pdf
3   The Trans-Pacific Parternship does not encompass a special,
    industry-focused section on motor vehicle trade. However, Chap-
    ter 2 entitled National Treatment and Market Access for Goods
    lists specific multilateral Annexes that target US/Japan and Cana-
    da/Japan relationships (see 2-D: Canada Appendix D Appendix
    between Japan and Canada on Motor Vehicle Trade, 2-D: United
    States Appendix D Appendix between the US and Japan on
    Motor Vehicle Trade, 2-D: Japan Appendix D-1 Appendix be-
    tween Japan and the US on Motor Vehicle Trade, 2-D: Japan
    Appendix D-2 Appendix between Japan and Canada on Motor
    Vehicle Trade).
4   Regarding the political dimension of thresholds, see Agathe VAN
    LANG, Droit de I'environnement, Paris, PUF, pp. 78-80.


EJRR  1|2016