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94 Yale L. J. 1395 (1984-1985)
The Trolley Problem

handle is hein.journals/ylr94 and id is 1415 raw text is: Comments
The Trolley Problem
Judith Jarvis Thomsonf
I.
Some years ago, Philippa Foot drew attention to an extraordinarily in-
teresting problem. Suppose you are the driver of a trolley. The trolley
rounds a bend, and there come into view ahead five track workmen, who
have been repairing the track. The track goes through a bit of a valley at
that point, and the sides are steep, so you must stop the trolley if you are
to avoid running the five men down. You step on the brakes, but alas they
don't work. Now you suddenly see a spur of track leading off to the right.
You can turn the trolley onto it, and thus save the five men on the straight
track ahead. Unfortunately, Mrs. Foot has arranged that there is one
track workman on that spur of track. He can no more get off the track in
time than the five can, so you will kill him if you turn the trolley onto
him. Is it morally permissible for you to turn the trolley?
Everybody to whom I have put this hypothetical case says, Yes, it is.2
Some people say something stronger than that it is morally permissible for
you to turn the trolley: They say that morally speaking, you must turn
it-that morality requires you to do so. Others do not agree that morality
t  Professor of Philosophy, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. B.A., Barnard College 1950,
Cambridge University 1952; M.A., Cambridge University 1956; Ph.D., Columbia University 1959.
Many people have given me helpful criticism of this essay's many successive reincarnations over the
years; I cannot list them all-for want of space, not of gratitude. Most recently, it benefited from
criticism by the members of the Yale Law School Civil Liability Workshop and the Legal Theory
Workshop, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto.
1. See P. FOOT, The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double Effect, in VIRTUES AND
VICES AND OTHER ESSAYS IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY 19 (1978).
2. I think it possible (though by no means certain) that John Taurek would say No, it is not
permissible to (all simply) turn the trolley; what you ought to do is flip a coin. See Taurek, Should
the Numbers Count?, 6 PHIL. & PuB. AFF. 293 (1977). (But he is there concerned with a different
kind of case, namely that in which what is in question is not whether we may do what harms one to
avoid harming five, but whether we may or ought to choose to save five in preference to saving one.)
For criticism of Taurek's article, see Parfit, Innumerate Ethics, 7 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 285 (1978).

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