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35 Conn. L. Rev. 1549 (2002-2003)
The Mythic Defense of Justice in Plato's Republic

handle is hein.journals/conlr35 and id is 1559 raw text is: The Mythic Defense of Justice in Plato's Republic

JONATHAN LEAR*
I want to talk to you today about the concept of justice-in particular,
as it makes its first sustained appearance in western philosophy, in Plato's
Republic. You have made a life choice to spend your lives in the midst of
justice, and The Republic is basically a book which asks what is to be said
in favor of that choice.
That is the question that Socrates and Thrasymachus raise in Book
One. Thrasymachus, a skeptic of sorts, claims that really justice is the ad-
vantage of the stronger. Each regime will write laws that favor those in
charge: Aristocracies will have laws that favor aristocracies, monarchies
will have laws that favor monarchs, democracies will have laws that favor
the democratic regime. In each case, the regime will claim that the laws
are just. But in every case justice is the strong getting what they want.
And, then by the end of his speech, he argues that, in fact, if one were
strong enough to do so, one would be unjust. If you could get away with it,
injustice would be better for you. But since you cannot, justice is second
best.
Socrates responds that no matter what situation one is in the just life is
the best. The two of them get into a familiar kind of Socratic debate-
known as elenchus. But by the end of Book One there is a spectacular
breakdown in the argument. In some sense, Socrates wins, but he wins
what even he recognizes is a hollow victory. Thrasymachus is sulking
because he has not been allowed to argue as he sees fit, Socrates continues
to indulge in his refutation--and no one is convinced.
It seems to me that what is put on display by the end of Book One is
the failure of Socrates' method. (In law schools people talk about the So-
cratic method, but the professors actually know the answers they are
looking for. I am convinced that Socrates was earnest when he said he
genuinely did not know.) But more is at stake that just Socrates' peculiar
method of cross-examination. What is being put on display is a kind of
breakdown of rational argument itself as a persuasive tool when it comes to
Jonathan Lear is John U. Nef Distinguished Service Professor at the Committee on Social
Thought, University of Chicago.

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