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95 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1141 (2000-2001)
Issue 4

handle is hein.journals/illlr95 and id is 1151 raw text is: Copyright 2001 by Northwesten Universiy School of Law                    Pr=:d t USA
Nohwestrn University Law Review                                            Vet 95. No 4
Articles
TIME-SHIFTED RATIONALITY AND THE LAW OF
LAW'S LEVERAGE: BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS
MEETS BEHAVIORAL BIOLOGY
Owen D. Jones
INTRODUCTION
People behave rationally. Except, apparently, when they don't. They
get emotional, comply with costly social norms, and offer puzzlingly poor
performances on any number of seemingly simple analytic tasks. This is,
increasingly, a problem for both economists and legal thinkers.
It is increasingly a problem because the evidence of intriguingly pat-
terned human irrationality has achieved critical mass and continues to grow.
It is a problem for economists because the standard economic model as-
sumes that humans will respond rationally to changes in incentives. And it
is a problem for legal policymakers because they so often rely on economic
analysis when recommending ways that incentives should be changed to
achieve the goals of law with the tools of law. Where the economics is
wrong, the law may be too.
As a result of the increasingly frequent mismatch between the popular
theory of human behavior and the human behavior that is popular, a number
of influential legal scholars have recently published articles arguing that
something ought be done, and suggesting precisely what.' Generally, these
* Visiting Professor, University of Texas School of Law; Professor of Law, Arizona State Univer-
sity College of Law; Faculty Fellow, Center for the Study of Law, Science, and Technology; Research
Fellow, Gruter Institute for Law and Behavioral Research; BA, Amherst College; J.D., Yale Law School.
Ideas developed here were presented at The Olin Conference on Evolution and Legal Theory at
Georgetown University Law Center, April 16, 1999; the annual meeting ofthe Society for Evolutionary
Analysis in Law (SEAL), September 1999; and the Colloquium on Law, Behavioral Biology, and Eco-
nomics at Arizona State University College of Law, November 17, 2000. The author is grateful to par-
ticipants in these fora for many useful observations. John Alcock, Anupan Chander, Helena Cronin,
Robert Ellickson, Ira Ellman, Adam Gifford, Oliver Goodenough, Lydia Jones, Dennis Kadjala, Russell
Korobkin, John McGinnis, Erin O'Hara, Richard Posner, Jeffrey Rachlinski, John Robertson, Paul
Rubin, Jeffrey Stake, Lynn Stout, Andy Thomson, Thomas Ulen, Amy Wax, Larry Winer, Paul Zak, and
Todd Zywicki also provided particularly helpful comments on preliminary versions. E. Donald Elliott,
Robert Frank, and Jack Hirshleifer suggested a number of useful sources. Sonia Krainz, Eva Shine, and
Charles Oldham offered able research assistance, and Arizona State University College of Law provid.d
generous scholarship support.
I See, eg., Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein, & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and

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