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38 Wash. U. J. L. & Pol'y 17 (2012)
Juvenile Justice after Graham v. Florida: Keeping Due Process, Autonomy, and Paternalism in Balance

handle is hein.journals/wajlp38 and id is 19 raw text is: Juvenile Justice After Graham v. Florida: Keeping
Due Process, Autonomy, and Paternalism in Balance
Kristin Henning*
Legal disputes involving children invariably evoke a complex
matrix of issues such as child and adolescent capacity, individual
rights and autonomy, parental authority, and in the criminal justice
context-diminished culpability for a minor's actions. While it is
difficult to identify a clear and cohesive jurisprudence regarding the
balance between children's autonomy and children's vulnerability
across Supreme Court cases, a series of cases over the last decade,
including Roper v. Simmons,' Graham           v. Florida,2 and J.D.B. v.
North   Carolina,3 offer a more        consistent view     of children   as
vulnerable, malleable, and in need of protection, at least in the
criminal and delinquency context. In each of these cases, the Court
solidly reaffirms the view that youth lack maturity and are more
susceptible to negative influences.4 In Graham, the focus of this
Symposium, the Court relied on this view of adolescence to conclude
that a sentence of life without the possibility of parole is cruel and
unusual punishment for juveniles who are not as well formed and
therefore less responsible than adults for their conduct.! This holding
is undoubtedly a win for youth and youth advocates concerned
about the increasingly harsh legal responses to adolescent criminal
* Kristin Henning, Professor of Law, Co-Director, Juvenile Justice Clinic, Georgetown
Law. Special thanks to Lauren Dollar for invaluable research assistance and to Wallace Mlyniec
for reading an early draft of this Essay.
1. 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (finding that the death penalty is cruel and unusual
punishment for juveniles).
2. 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010) (finding that life without parole for non-homicide
offenses is cruel and unusual punishment for juveniles).
3. 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2408 (2011) (finding that age must be considered in the custody
analysis for purposes of Miranda).
4. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026; Roper, 543 U.S. at 569; see also JDB., 131 S. Ct. at
2403.
5. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 569-70).

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