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77 Stan. L. Rev. 1 (2025)
Speech Certainty: Algorithmic Speech and the Limits of the First Amendment

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ARTICLE


Speech Certainty: Algorithmic Speech and

        the Limits of the First Amendment


                      Mackenzie Austin & Max Levy'


Abstract. Machine learning algorithms increasingly mediate our public discourse-from
search engines to social media platforms to artificial intelligence companies. As their
influence on online speech swells, so do questions of whether and how   the First
Amendment   may apply to their output. A growing chorus of scholars has expressed doubt
over whether  the output of machine learning algorithms is truly speech within the
meaning  of the First Amendment, but none have suggested a workable way to cleanly
draw the line between speech and non-speech. This Article proposes a way to successfully
draw that line based on a principle that we call speech certainty-the basic idea that
speech is only speech if the speaker knows what he said when he said it. This idea is rooted
in the text, history, and purpose of the First Amendment, and built into modern speech
doctrines of editorial discretion and expressive conduct. If this bedrock principle has been
overlooked, it is because, until now, all speech has been imbued with speech certainty.
Articulating its existence was never necessary. But machine learning has changed that.
Unlike traditional code, a close look at how machine learning algorithms work reveals
that the programmers who create them can never be certain of their output. Because that
output lacks speech certainty, it's not the programmer's speech. Accordingly, this Article
contends that  the output of  machine  learning algorithms isn't entitled to First
Amendment   protection. It reveals that the question of how an algorithm works is
constitutionally significant. With the Supreme Court in Moody v. NetChoice demanding
further inquiry into what constitutes protected expressive activity for social media
platforms, that question can no longer be ignored. By failing to distinguish between
traditional and machine learning algorithms, we  risk sleepwalking into a radical
departure from centuries of First Amendment jurisprudence. Protection for the output of
machine  learning algorithms would, for the first time in the Constitution's history,


* Mackenzie Austin is a practicing attorney in California. She served as a Law Clerk for the
  U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. J.D., Stanford Law School, 2022. Max Levy
  is a practicing attorney in California. J.D., Stanford Law School, 2022. We're grateful to
  Eugene Volokh and the editors of the Journal of Free Speech Law, Paul Grewal, Peter
  Henderson, Evelyn Douek, and the editors of the Stanford Law Review for their feedback
  and comments, and to Rick Rubin for the fateful nudge to put ideas to paper. Although
  Stanford Law Review convention suggests use of a single set of pronouns throughout an
  Article, we alternate usage between he/him and she/her across top-level Parts of the
  Article (e.g., Parts I, II, III, etc.) to reflect the gender of both authors.


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