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12 Berkeley J. Crim. L. 1 (2007)
Confessions and Harmless Error: A New Argument for the Old Approach

handle is hein.journals/bjcl12 and id is 3 raw text is: ARTICLE 1 HIRSCH DOt                                                   1072007 1047 50 AM

Confessions and Harmless Error: A New
Argument for the Old Approach
Alan Hirscht
False confessions are perilous because juries almost always believe a
defendant who confesses to a crime, in spite of any other evidence to the
contrary.1 Accordingly, courts should carefully guard against the introduction
of unreliable confessions.2 To a certain extent, they do. Trial judges exclude
confessions if the police failed to observe certain procedures,3 or if, based on
the totality of the circumstances, the confessions seem to have been the product
of coercion.4   Until 1991, whenever a court of appeals determined that a
confession   was   erroneously    admitted   into  evidence, the    court would
automatically reverse the defendant's conviction.5      However, in Arizona v.
Fulminante,6 the United States Supreme Court altered this approach, holding
that wrongful admission of a confession is subject to harmless-error review.
t Visiting Professor of Legal Studies, Williams College. J.D., Yale Law School.
1. Richard A. Leo, False Confessions: Causes, Consequences, and Solutions, in WRONGLY
CONVICTED: PERSPECTIVES ON FAILED JUSTICE 36 (Saundra D. Westervelt & John A. Humphrey
eds.. 2001); see also Richard Leo & Richard Ofshe, The Consequences of False Confessions:
Deprivation of Liberty and Miscarriages of Justice in the Age of Psychological Interrogation, 88
J. CRIM. L & CRIMINOLOGY 429, 429 (1998) (A false confession is therefore an exceptionally
dangerous piece of evidence to put before anyone adjudicating a case.).
2. See, e.g., Saul Kassin & Holly Sukel, Coerced Confessions and the Jury: An
Experimental Test of the Harmless Error Rule, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 27, 42-43 (1997)
(Our results thus suggest that confession evidence has a profound. context-resistant impact on
jurors and should be admitted only with extreme caution.).
3. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 462 63 (1966) (holding that a confession
must be excluded if a suspect is not informed of his rights to counsel and silence prior to
interrogations).
4. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 285 86 (1991) (White, J., joined by Marshall,
Brennan, Stevens. Scalia, JJ.).
5. See, e.g., Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 568 (1958) (reversing defendant's conviction
and death sentence because his confession was coerced). The court of appeals reviews de novo
the determination that a confession was voluntary. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104. 110 (1985).
6. 499 U.S. 279 (1991).
7. The appellate court applies the same harmless-error standard to wrongly admitted
confessions as it applies to all other trial errors, that set forth in Chapman v. California. 386 U.S.
18 (1967): [B]efore a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to
declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 24. Over the years, in
various harmless-error decisions, the Court has vacillated between two different inquiries into

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