Human Cloning and Stem Cell Research: Who Should Decide Where to Draw the Line 39 New England Law Review 2004-2005

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39 New Eng. L. Rev. 635 (2004-2005)
Human Cloning and Stem Cell Research: Who Should Decide Where to Draw the Line

handle is hein.journals/newlr39 and id is 645 raw text is: HUMAN CLONING AND STEM CELL
RESEARCH: WHO SHOULD DECIDE
WHERE TO DRAW THE LINE?
JUNE MARY ZEKAN MAKDISI*
People hold a variety of opinions concerning where to draw the line
on using human embryos for purposes of stem cell research and human
cloning. Rather than commenting directly on the appeal of any particular
opinion, I would like to focus on perhaps a more preliminary question:
Who should make the decision about where the line should be drawn? As
noted by Regine Kollek, most relevant to that issue is: [H]ow do we want
to live? As individuals, as [pockets of] societ[ies, or] as [a] global
communit[y]?1
I. INDIVIDUALS AS DECISION-MAKERS
A familiar ethos of U.S. culture is one of individualism,2 emphasizing
autonomy and self-determination.3 In the context of American liberalism,
autonomous decision-making places a premium on choice as it is divorced
from its objective, substantive dimension. Of primary importance is the
value of choice itself, protected for its own sake'' as an exercise of
* Associate Professor, St. Thomas University School of Law; B.A., University of
Pennsylvania; M.S., University of Pennsylvania; J.D., University of Tulsa College of
Law.
t. Regine Kollek, Technicalisation of Human Procreation and Social Living Conditions,
in THE ETHICS OF GENETICS IN HUMAN PROCREATION 139, 157 (Hille Haker & Deryck
Beyleveld eds., Ashgate Publ'g Ltd. 2000).
2. See Peter H. Schuck, Affirmative Action: Past, Present, and Future, 20 YALE L. &
POL'Y REV. 1, 91 (2002); Judith L. Maute, Pre-Paid and Group Legal Services:
Thirty Years After the Storm, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 915, 917 (2001).
3. Kevin P. Quinn, Viewing Health Care as a Common Good: Looking Beyond Political
Liberalism, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 277, 285 (2000).
4. Frederick Mark Gedicks, An Unfirm Foundation: The Regrettable Indefensibility of
Religious Exemptions, 20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 555, 563 (1998).