About | HeinOnline Law Journal Library | HeinOnline Law Journal Library | HeinOnline

LOG IN
LOG IN


83 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 693 (1992-1993)
The Criminal-Civil Distinction and Dangerous Blameless Offenders

handle is hein.journals/jclc83 and id is 703 raw text is: 0091-4169/93/8304-0693 THEJOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW & CRIMINOLOGY Vol. 83, No. 4 Copyright 0 1993 by Northwestern University, School of Law Printed in U.S.A. SUPREME COURT REVIEW FOREWORD: THE CRIMINAL-CIVIL DISTINCTION AND DANGEROUS BLAMELESS OFFENDERS PAUL H. ROBINSON* Our legal system distinguishes criminal law from civil law, and criminal commitment from civil commitment. We speak of a crime, rather than a violation or a breach, and punish- ment, rather than sanction or liability. Why is criminal law kept distinct? One can conceive of a system in which no such crimi- nal-civil distinction exists. An actor who commits a violation of the legal rules of conduct (not a crime) would have jurisdiction taken over him (not convicted), during which time he would be corrected or sanctioned (but not punished). Under this system, what is now dealt with as criminal law would be treated as just another aspect of civil law. In fact, because it is not unusual for different aspects of civil law to have different procedures, perhaps even current criminal procedures could be followed. Some academics have proposed just such a system,1 although I know of no society in which such a system currently operates. Why are societies persistent in maintaining a distinct system labelled as criminal? Criminal law is not unique in the conduct it punishes; some conduct violates criminal and civil law.2 Nor is criminal law unique in the deprivations that it imposes; civil commitment, tort law, and a variety of other civil measures can deprive a person of his or her * Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law. The author wishes to acknowledge the useful criticisms of participants at a faculty workshop at Northwestern University School of Law. 1 See, e.g., BARBARA WooTroN, CRIME AND THE CRIMINAL LAW chs. 2-3 (1963); Jay Campbell, A Strict Accountability Approach to Criminal Responsibility, 29 FED. PROBATION, Dec. 1965, at 33; SHELDON GLUECK, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY ch. 4 (1963). 2 In this Article, the phrase civil law refers to all law that is not criminal. That is, the criminal-civil distinction is taken to be comprehensive in its coverage. Other defini- tions of civil law are possible, of course. 693