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52 Cent. L.J. 129 (1901)
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handle is hein.journals/cntrlwj52 and id is 135 raw text is: V CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL. m et for which damages may be recovered in aia-,ction for slander, and such suffering may be increased and the damages consequently enlyiced, by the fact that the members of the platntiff's family suffered by reason of the disgrace vested upon him, or ber, .owing to the slanderous charge. It seems difficult to, conceive an action ex delicto where the sole damage complained of should be that' arising from mental distress unaccompanied by other injury. The opinion in Canning v. Williamatown~l states that uo damages would lie for mental suffering and fright alone', but thig:was merely obiter dictim, and the lean- ing of judicial opinion would seem to be in the other direction. Jackson, J., charging the jIury in Barbour v. Stephenson,4 stated that it was to the credit of modern juris- prudence that the law, in an action for the sedctitin of a child, had advanced suf- fibiemly beyond' -the relics of barbarism tp permit the parent to recover for all that he oan feel from the nature of the injury, and there seems no goo I reason why the Wtongdoer should escape the consequences o!f his act, whether the injury be of a phys- iqol' or mental nature. The question of public policy is not discussed upon that point, a ruling must always be, to a certain ttent, arbitrary. Viewed, however, from a purely logical standpoint, and taking into consideration the legal principles involved, it would seem that recovery might be had in an avtion ex delicto based upon the damage sus-, ,sined by reason of menial suffering per se. donsidbr the distress dnd anxiety of a parent upon reading the unveritied report of the death cif a child, a statement subsequently proven false. Is this presumed condition of facts any the less a damage to the mentality than that sustained through the negligence of a telegraph company to properly transmit and deliver a message containing news of a sitpilar nature? Is the result of the wrong less proximate, or less probable and natural? I the wrongdoer, in the latter case, put mni1 n- upon inquiry as to the result of his wr'ongful act thai in t he former? It would seem not. When this phase of the question of compensatory damages for mental suffer- ing-is fairly presented for adjudication, the 1 Cush. (Miss.) 451. 21.32 Fed. Rep. 66. decision, in comparison with the present trend of judicial opinion, must prove of the deepest interest. Chicago, Ill. G. C. HAMILTON, LL. B. CONTRACT - PERSONAL SERVICES - DEATH OF PARTY-PUBLIC POLICY. BLATELY v. SOUSA. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, Oct. 8, 1900. 1. A contract for combination for mutual profit o the business ability of B, as manager, and the musical talent of S, as director, in the organization and touriog of a band,-the compensation to be paid S to be a proportion of the profits,-is dissolved by the death of B. 2. Though a contract for combination of the busi- ness ability of B, as managerv and the musical ability of S, as director, in the organization and totnvlng of a band provided that a corporation may be formed by B, and the contract assigned to it, the contract does not on this account survive to the personal represent- ative of B on his death, without such corporation}. being formed. 3. A contract for the use by B of the name ofS, a musical di'ector, for the name of a band, vlth6ut S being connected With it, eannnt h -,'orced, 9sit would be a fraud on tih ouhlia BROWN, J.: Neither the complainant nor the respondent is satisfied with the decree made in the court below. Each has appealed from it; the former complaining that it gives her too little, and the latter asserting that she gets too much. The appeal of the cotllpJainant, though taken later than that of the respondent, will be first considered, as it raises the most important ques- tions to be disposed of. The contract out of which this controversy arose was in writing, having been executed by the parties-to it on June 27, ]892; and the obligation assumed by each weve k thvautgh a laurbad -at (Ave yomro from August 1, 1892. Before the expiration of this period David Blakely, oneof the contracting parties, died; and the first and most important question Is as to the effect of his death upon the agreement and the personal representative in- sists that the ccntract was unaffected by-his death; that, as his substitute in it, she has soc- ceeded to all his rights nnde it, and can compel full performance by Sousa, the survivor' The latter, however, contends that personal services to be rendered by the deceased, who possessed peculiar ability and qualifications, were the In- ducement that led hill, to enter into the contract,. and that the relations established by it were dis- solved by the death of him whose personal quali- ties had so induced him. The effect of the death of a party to a contract.whose distinctly personal services.involving peculiar skill and. experience, are at the foundation of it. in the absence of any provision that the survivor must accept perform- ance by tie personal representative of the de- VQL. 5 2