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46 Am. J. Int'l L. 428 (1952)
Object Theory of the Individual in International Law, The

handle is hein.journals/ajil46 and id is 434 raw text is: THE OBJECT -THEORY OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN INTERNATIONAL LAW By GEORGE MANNER Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Illinois Among the solutions to the highly controversial issue of the standing of the individual in international law is the theory that the individual is not a subject, but an object, of this law. This solution, moreover, represents the currently dominant doctrinal conception of the position of men in this law. For ever since its formulation in 1896 this theory has been expressly or tacitly accepted by nearly all of those jurists who may be collectively designated as the subjective positivist school of international law, and these jurists have ever since that time predominated in the science of this law. Nevertheless, the validity of this theory has also been questioned seriously. The time seems ripe therefore for a reappraisal of this doctrine. I. TE OBJECT THEORY As first formulated and as commonly understood, the object theory of the individual in international law predicates, first, that the individual is not a subject or person of this law; that he has no rights and duties what- soever under it or that he cannot invoke it for his protection nor violate its rules. Secondly, this doctrine predicates that, as object, the individual is but a thing from the point of view of this law or that he is benefited or restrained by this law only insofar and to the extent that it makes it the right or the duty of states to protect his interests or to regulate his conduct within their respective jurisdictions through their domestic laws. It predicates, further, that the individual as such, or as object, has no inter- national right or claim against states to be made by them an object of their international rights and duties or to be treated by them according to inter- national law once they have in fact made him an object thereof. Rather, it holds, the individual must look to states also in these respects. It as- serts, moreover, that only nationals of states are such objects of inter- national law and that these persons are protected as objects of this law only 'Subjective positivism, because these jurists allege that a subjective factor, will or consent of, or recognition by states, provides the immediate or juridical foundation for the obligation of positive international law. As such, this school is opposed to an eclectic positivism basing the obligation of what it deems positive international law upon this subjective factor and some allegedly objective factor, such as society, reason, a fundamental juridical or moral hypothesis, principle, or norm, and to an objective positivism grounding the obligation of this law upon such an objective factor alone. 428