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2 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 387 (2004-2005)
Justifications and Excuses

handle is hein.journals/osjcl2 and id is 393 raw text is: Justifications and Excuses Marcia Baron* The distinction between justifications and excuses is a familiar one to most of us who work either in moral philosophy or legal philosophy. But exactly how it should be understood is a matter of considerable disagreement. My aim in this paper is, first, to sort out the differences and try to figure out what underlying disagreements account for them. I give particular attention to the following question: Does a person who acts on a reasonable but mistaken belief have a justification, or only an excuse? One disagreement I highlight concerns the extent to which justification is primarily about agents rather than about actions (viewed in isolation from the agents performing them). Those who think, as I do, of His action, X, was justified as He was justified in doing X are far more likely to allow that justfication requires reasonable belief and does not require truth, than are those who think of His action, X, was justified as Although actions of this type usually are prohibited, X is in these circumstances in fact permissible. In addition to (and sometimes in the course ol) sorting out the differences and tracing them to some underlying disagreements, I defend the reasonable belief view of justification against some objections, and argue that, whether or not we continue to use the term 'justified in a way that does not require truth (and does require reasonable belie), we need the concept. Contrary to the claims of some who reject the reasonable belief view ofjustification, justification thus understood does not reduce to excuse. I. In law, philosophy, and everyday life, we recognize a distinction between justifications and excuses. Many (though not all) of us think the distinction an important one. Just how do justifications differ from excuses? I will argue in favor of tethering justification to reasonable belief rather than to truth (thus allowing that mistaken self-defense should count as justified as long as the mistaken belief is reasonable). But I am equally interested in diagnosing where the disagreements arise. To that end, I will spend some time setting out what is uncontroversial, seeing how far one can go before bumping up against * Rudy Professor of Philosophy, Indiana University; author of KANTIAN ETHICS ALMOST WITHOUT APOLOGY (1995), and co-author (with Philip Pettit and Michael Slote) of THREE METHODS OF ETHICS (1997). I am grateful to Fred Schmitt for discussions of justification in epistemology, to Sharon Byrd for e-mail exchanges about justifications and excuses, to Antony Duff for extensive written comments as well as for earlier discussions, and to my commentator, Joachim Hruschka, and other discussants in the Workshop on Criminal Responsibility at the 2003 IVR meeting in Lund, Sweden.