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53 Antitrust Bull. 271 (2008)
Buying Power, Competition Policy, and Antitrust: The Competitive Effects of Discrimination among Suppliers

handle is hein.journals/antibull53 and id is 293 raw text is: THE ANTITRUST BULLETIN: Vol. 53, No. 2/Summer 2008 : 271

Buyer power, competition policy,
and antitrust: the competitive effects
of discrimination among suppliers
BY PETER C. CARSTENSEN*
Buyer power poses challenges for competition policy generally as
well as for antitrust law in particular. Historically, the visible prob-
lems have come in labor and agricultural commodity markets. More
recently, large retailers have been the object of concern and debate as
to their use of buyer power. In these contexts, the disproportionate
allocation of power and information between buyers and sellers has
made it extremely difficult to achieve fair, open, accessible, efficient,
and transparent markets. But these same issues exist in a number of
other markets including health care, insurance brokerage, and input
markets generally.
* George C. Young-Bascom Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin
Law School.
AUTHOR'S NOTE: A preliminary version of this article was presented at the American
Antitrust Institute conference on buyer power, June 20, 2007. The comments and
suggestions of the attendees were most helpfuil in the preparation of this article. This
article is a component of a larger project on the analysis of monopsony, oligopsony,
and buyer power that examines competitive effects of such power, the implications for
competitive policy generally, and the role of antitrust as zwell as other statutes in
avoiding the competitive harms of unnecessary and avoidable buyer power. Financial
support from the University of Wisconsin Graduate School and the Food Systems
Research Group is gratefully acknowledged.
© 2008 by Federal Legal Publications, Inc.