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12 Sapienza Legal Papers 507 (2024)
Leasio Enormis: Origin and Historical Evolution

handle is hein.journals/sapiezlep12 and id is 537 raw text is: ISSN 2785-1095 JINXIAN CHEN* LAESIOENORMIS: ORIGIN AND HISTORICAL EVOLUTION The rule of laesio enormis allows the disadvantaged party to circumvent the constraints of a legal transaction when being exploited by the otherparty, serving as a crucial legal device of private law justice. Originating in late antiquity, laesio enormis was initially implemented as a special intervention to protect vulnerable land sellers. In the medieval, the theory of just price made fairness in exchange a normal criterion for a valid legal transaction. Since modern times, despite the supremacy of autonomy of will, the substantive fairness of legal transaction has never been neglected. In free market, laesio enormis passively serves as a guardian of autonomy of will; but when exploitation arises, it positively acts as the pivotal in correcting freedom of contract. The historical evolution ofthe rule of laesio enormis reveals the interplay between autonomy of will and protection ofthe weak party, corresponding to the transition ofjustice in private law. SUMMARY: Introduction. - 1. The Origin of Laesio Enormis in Late Antiquity. - 1.1. From freedom of price to price intervention. - 1.2. Legal Analysis of Laesio Enormis in Late Antiquity. - 2. Generalization of Laesio Enormis in The Medieval. - 2.1. Theoretical Basis for Generalization: The Theory of Just Price. - 2.2. The Systematic Construction: The Proposal of dolus ex re ipsa. - 3. The Modern Reception of Laesio Enormis. - 3.1. French Law: Formal Retention and Substantial Limitation of The Rule ofLaesioEnormis. * PhD student of the Co-supervised PhD program between Sapienza University of Rome and Zhongnan University of Economics and Law. 507