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42 Ky. L.J. 281 (1953-1954)
Criminal Law--Premeditation Inferred from Use of Deadly Weapon

handle is hein.journals/kentlj42 and id is 281 raw text is: NOTES AND COMNTS CRIMINAL LAW-PREMEDITATION INFERRED FROM USE OF DEADLY WEAPON The deadly weapon doctrine staunchly buttresses a supposed defect in the common-law murder structure. This doctrine-that in- tent, the essential element in intentional murder, is to be inferred where a homicide has been achieved through the use of a deadly weapon-is generally accepted.' However, the question to be dis- cussed herein is: Should the doctrine be extended to support first de- gree murder where deliberation and premeditation make the dif- ference in degree? This would mean that deliberation and premedita- tion would be inferred in the same way as intent where a killing has been effected through the use of a deadly weapon. Intent is a subjective fact, rather than a fact of tangible, substantive matter. For this reason, intent is difficult to prove. Yet it remains the essential element in common law intentional murder. Faced with the delimma of this elusive subjective element, the common law sought and found a solution to the problem in the deadly weapon doctrine. The rationalization was that a person intends the natural consequences of his own acts, and if he acts with a deadly weapon, causing another's death, the law can raise an inference of intent.2 In this way the law made out his intent by working backwards from the killing: the homicide was the result of the act (use of a deadly weapon), and the act was the result of intent. And so, where the deadly weapon doc- trine was interjected by the prosecution, the state's case was prima facie. It meant that the accused had to show to the jury that his use of a deadly weapon was not evidence of intent-he had to destroy the state's inference of intent. A recent Arkansas case3 points up the use of the deadly weapon doctrine. The deceased was cut on the leg in an altercation in which the defendant was the aggressor. The defendant was armed with a knife and severed an artery, from which wound the deceased bled to death in 20 minutes. The court wrote: Malice and intent to kill may be implied from the use of weapons, such as knives, as here, capable of producing edath. 126 Am. Jir. 360. 'Liggins v. United States, 297 F. 881 (D.C. Cir. 1924); Mo-EroN, LAW OF HoncmCE 26 (1952). 'Wooten v. State, 249 S.W. 2d 964 (Ark. 1952). 1 Id. at 966. 'State v. Utley, 223 N.C. 39, 25 S.E. 2d 195 (1943).