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59 B.C. L. Rev. 877 (2018)
Board to Death: How Busy Directors Could Cause the Next Financial Crisis

handle is hein.journals/bclr59 and id is 895 raw text is: 







          BOARD TO DEATH: HOW BUSY

          DIRECTORS COULD CAUSE THE

               NEXT FINANCIAL CRISIS




                            JEREMY  C. KRESS


INTRODUCTION             .................................................................... 878

I. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS ............ ................ 882
  A. The Dual Roles ofthe Board.        ............................................. 882
  B. Financial Firms Are Special      ..............................    ...................... 885
     1. Differences Between Financial and Nonfinancial Firms   ..............        ...... 886
     2. The Unique Role of a Financial Institution Board .......................888
II. WHY DIRECTOR BUSYNESS MATTERS............................................... 891

  A. The Psychology ofBusyness.         ...............................      .............. 891
  B. Market-Wide Empirical Evidence         ................................................ 894
  C. Evidence from Financial Firms       .................................................... 899

III. CASE STUDIES.................................................................903
  A. Wells Fargo 's Fraudulent Accounts Scandal   ......................     .............. 904
  B. JPMorgan and the London Whale       ..................................      .......... 908

  C. PNC and the Financial Crisis......................... 913
IV. FINANCIAL COMPANY BOARDS ARE ALARMINGLY OVERCOMMITTED    ...............915
V. ALLEVIATING DIRECTOR OVERCOMMITMENT                      .................... 919
  A. Limitations ofPrivate Ordering..      ..........................................920

  B. Recommendations for Reform        ....................................................... 923
     1. Stricter Proxy Advisor Voting Standards.   ....................    ...................924
     2. Enhanced Supervisory Assessments ............................ .....925
     3. Targeted Regulatory Intervention.       ............................   ............926
     4. Increased Director Compensation.        ............................    ............ 927

CONCLUSION                 ......................................................929


















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