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24 Med. & L. 233 (2005)
Witness Evidence: Can It Be Trusted

handle is hein.journals/mlv24 and id is 243 raw text is: 

Med Law (2005) 24:233-242                                   Medicine
                                                              and Law
                                                            @YOZMOT2005

Medical Law

WITNESS EVIDENCE: CAN IT BE TRUSTED?
John S. Croucher*



      Abstract: Basic statistical principles are often widely misunderstood
      (and often mistrusted) by many members of the public at large. It comes
      as no shock that this also applies to legal practitioners. If there is an
      ignorance of the intricacies of statistics by the judiciary and counsel, it
      is not surprising that erroneous conclusions based on the evidence have
      arisen. These have even been afforded their own special designation as
      'fallacies', including those of both the prosecutor and defence. Whether
      or not the underlying mathematics is fully understood, it is essential
      that practitioners can correctly interpret information provided by
      witnesses, expert or otherwise. This article provides one contribution
      in that direction toward cases that specifically involve medical situations.
      It considers some of the more outrageous conclusions made, and
      accepted, in several high profile cases and considers the evidence more
      carefully. The challenge is to be able to determine the likelihood that
      any assertion made is actually true from a statistical point of view.
      Examples of how to make this determination are provided, including
      the all-important notion of conditional probability.

      Keywords: Conditional probability; reliability; fallacy; DNA; witness;
      error.


INTRODUCTION
The application of statistics in the legal context can be a minefield to the
uninitiated. There are numerous examples where fundamental errors have been
made when attempting to draw conclusions from probabilities in which a basic
misunderstanding of the rules is evident (Aitken 1996). So well known are
these errors that they have been given their own title such as 'the prosecutor's


* Professsor. Macquarie University, Sydney, NSW, Australia


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