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34 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 405 (2008)
Corruption and Post-Conflict Peace-Building

handle is hein.journals/onulr34 and id is 411 raw text is: Corruption and Post-Conflict Peace-Building

SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN*
I. INTRODUCTION
States emerging from conflict generally have very weak institutions and
an influx of outside funds. These two conditions provide incentives for
officials to make corrupt deals for personal gain. Outsiders who are brought
in to monitor and manage the transition are also at risk of becoming corrupt.
The prior conflict is likely to have fostered a culture of secrecy and impunity
where self-dealing is easy to conceal. The end of the conflict may not
encourage the development of a transparent and accountable government,
especially if those who gained financially from the conflict are in power and
seek both to preserve past gains and to benefit from the rebuilding effort.
Thus, although incentives for corruption exist in all societies, the incidence
and scale of corruption may be especially high and destructive in post-conflict
situations. Political leaders buy-off powerful private actors with patronage,
including criminal groups and wealthy business interests. Those powerful
private actors also buy off weak politicians with money or promises of future
jobs and business ventures. The post-conflict political system may be in a
corruption trap where payoffs build in expectation of future payoffs, resulting
in a vicious spiral.'
Unless care is taken, a sharp break with a corrupt status quo can breed
instability and violence as those who benefited from the corrupt system
struggle to maintain their positions.2 If conflict-prevention and peace-building
are supported by outside funds from international institutions, these funds may
simply be diverted into the pockets of the powerful with some trickling down
* Henry R. Luce, Professor of Jurisprudence (Law and Political Science), at Yale University. This
article is a revision of the Professor Rose-Ackerman's Dean's Lecture at the Ohio Northern University
College of Law (Oct. 4, 2007). The case study materials on Guatemala, Angola and Kosovo were prepared
by Jael Humphrey, Rodrigo de Souza, and Dastid Pallaska, respectively. I am very grateful to all of them
for their excellent work. This article's framework was developed in Susan Rose-Ackerman, Corruption and
Government, J. INT'L PEACEKEEPING (forthcoming 2008). For an introduction to the literature on corruption,
see generally SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION: A STUDY IN POLrICAL ECONOMY (Academic Press
1978); SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES AND REFORM
(Cambridge University Press 1999); Pranab Bardhan, Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues,
35 J. OF ECON. LITERATURE 1320 (1997); Edward L Glaeser, & Claudia Goldin, Corruption and Reform:
Lessons from America's Economic History (NAT'L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, Working Paper No.
10775, 2004), available at http//www.nber.org/papers/w 10775.
1. Alix J Boucher et al., Mapping and Fighting Corruption in War-Torn States 11-23 (2007),
avaliable at http://www.stimson.orgtfopo/pdf/Mapping-and-Fighting-Corruption-inWar-Tom-States.pdf.
2. Philippe Le Billon, Buying Peace or Fueling War: The Role of Corruption in Armed Conflicts,
15 J. OF INT'L DEV. 413, 424 (2003).