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68 Fordham L. Rev. 407 (1999-2000)
The Jury's Role in Deciding Normative Issues in the American Common Law

handle is hein.journals/flr68 and id is 421 raw text is: THE JURY'S ROLE IN DECIDING NORMATIVE
ISSUES IN THE AMERICAN COMMON LAW
Mark P. Gergen*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION     ....................................................................................... 407
I.    THE HISTORIC ROLE OF THE COMMON LAW JURY ............. 417
II.   PHYSICAL OR PERSONAL TORTS ............................................. 424
A .  N egligence ........................................................................... 424
B.   Intentional Torts ................................................................. 439
Im .  CONTRACT    LAW     ........................................................................ 440
A. Classical Contract Law ...................................................... 442
B.   Standards of Fair Dealing ................................................. 451
IV. ECONOMIC TORTS AND RESTITUTION ................................... 461
A. Improper Interference ........................................................ 463
B.   Unjust Enrichment ............................................................. 468
V.    ABUSE OF CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIP ............................ 475
CONCLUSION     ........................................................................................... 484
INTRODUCTION
MAGINE that you have been given a scale and the task to use that
scale to derive the values that underlie the division of power
between judge and jury to decide normative issues in the American
common law. You would probably start by putting on the scale the
familiar costs and benefits of rules and standards.' These go on the
* Much of this Article is based on conversations with colleagues, including
David Anderson, Steve Goode, Douglas Laycock, Sandy Levinson, Richard
Markovits, William Powers, Alan Rau, David Robertson, Charles Silver, Steve Smith
(now at McGill), Patrick Woolley, and Charles Alan Wright. An earlier version was
presented at a workshop at Northwestern University School of Law.
1. This article defines rules and standards in the usual way. The following
definition is typical: Rules are legal norms that are formal and mechanical. They are
triggered by a few easily identified factual matters and are opaque in application to
the values they are designed to serve. Standards, on the other hand, are flexible,
context-sensitive legal norms that require evaluative judgments in their application.
Larry Alexander & Ken Kress, Against Legal Principles, 82 Iowa L Rev. 739, 740
(1997). Some commentators insist on a further division between standards that