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85 S. Cal. L. Rev. 499 (2011-2012)
Rethinking the Economic Basis of the Standard Oil Refining Monopoly: Dominance against Competing Cartels

handle is hein.journals/scal85 and id is 505 raw text is: RETHINKING THE ECONOMIC BASIS
OF THE STANDARD OIL REFINING
MONOPOLY: DOMINANCE AGAINST
COMPETING CARTELS
GEORGE L. PRIEST*
ABSTRACT
The success of the Standard Oil monopoly is not well understood.
Standard Oil first developed a monopoly over the refining of crude oil,
though later extended its control to gathering pipelines, later still to trunk
pipelines (from the western Oil Regions to East Coast ports) and, even
later, expanded operations to include oil production (drilling) and retail
sales at the time the Supreme Court ordered its dissolution over 100 years
ago, in 1911.
Though there are several journalistic exposgs of Standard Oil-
including Henry Demarest Lloyd and Ida Tarbell, as well as business
histories-none are fully explanatory. The currently dominant theory of
Standard Oil's success is by Elizabeth Granitz and Benjamin Klein who
assert that Standard Oil was chosen by oil shippers, the railroads, to police
a railroad cartel. According to Granitz and Klein, the railroads split with
Standard Oil the profits from cartelization of the crude and refined oil
industry.
* Edward J. Phelps Professor of Law and Economics and Kauffman Distinguished Research
Scholar in Law, Economics, and Entrepreneurship, Yale Law School. I am grateful to Jonathan
Kandelshein for excellent research assistance and to the Milton and Miriam Handler Foundation for a
grant to Yale Law School for support for this work. I am also grateful to Alvin K. Klevorick, Bruce
Ackerman, Robert Ellickson, Benjamin Klein, Claire Priest, Nicholas Priest, Norman Silber and to
participants in the Yale Law School Faculty Workshop for comments on an earlier draft.

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