Presidents and Process: A Comparison of the Regulatory Process under the Clinton and Bush (43) Administrations 23 Journal of Law & Politics 2007

About | HeinOnline Law Journal Library | HeinOnline Law Journal Library | HeinOnline

23 J.L. & Pol. 393 (2007)
Presidents and Process: A Comparison of the Regulatory Process under the Clinton and Bush (43) Administrations

handle is hein.journals/jlp23 and id is 401 raw text is: Presidents and Process: A Comparison of the
Regulatory Process Under the Clinton and
Bush (43) Administrations
Stuart Shapiro*
INTRODUCTION
Debates over regulatory policy focus both on the substance of
regulations and on the nature of the regulatory process. Despite the often
strident nature of these debates, there are several propositions that generate
widespread agreement. Few would argue that the substance of regulations
has been dramatically different in the George W. Bush Administration than
in that of Bill Clinton.' And while the merits of various aspects of the
regulatory process are the subject of considerable debate, the vigor with
which these debates are carried out2 is evidence of agreement that the
process is important.
Despite the perceived importance of the regulatory process in affecting
regulatory substance, large-scale empirical examinations of the process are
limited. In particular, we have little idea how the regulatory process varies
with changes in regulatory substance. Does the process look very different
in a presidential administration that has a pro-regulatory outlook than in
one that favors deregulation? This article is a large-scale empirical
examination of the role of procedural controls in the rulemaking process. I
compare variables characterizing the regulatory process from analogous
periods in the Clinton and Bush (43) administrations. It is well documented
that the regulatory preferences of these two presidents are quite different.3
Despite this, I find that the regulatory process is remarkably similar
# Stuart Shapiro is an assistant professor of public policy at the Edward J. Bloustein School of
Planning and Public Policy at Rutgers University. Prior to working at Rutgers, he worked at the Office
of Information and Regulatory Affairs. The author would like to thank Winstina Hughes and Andrew
Cottrell for research assistance and Anne Gowen, Cary Coglianese, Steven Balla, Laura Langbein, John
Morrall, and Sally Katzen for helpful comments on previous drafts of this work.
See, e.g., CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS & OMB WATCH ON BEHALF OF CITIZENS FOR SENSIBLE
SAFEGUARDS, SPECIAL INTEREST TAKEOVER: THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION AND THE DISMANTLING OF
PUBLIC SAFEGUARDS (2004).
2 See, e.g., Wendy E. Wagner, Importing Daubert to Administrative Agencies Through the
Information Quality Act, 12 J.L. & POL'Y 589 (2004); John D. Graham, Managing the Regulatory
State: The Experience of the Bush Administration, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 953 (2006).
3 THOMAS 0. MCGARITY, SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO, RENA 1. STEINZOR, JOANNA GOGER & MARGARET
CLUNE, CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REGULATION, TRUTH AND SCIENCE BETRAYED: THE CASE AGAINST
THE INFORMATION QUALITY ACT (2005).