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2 Admin. L.J. 269 (1988)
Judicial Deference to Execute Agencies and the Decline of the Nondelegation Doctrine

handle is hein.journals/adminlj2 and id is 275 raw text is: JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO EXECUTIVE AGENCIES AND
THE DECLINE OF THE NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE
DOUGLAS W. KMIEC*
INTRODUCTION
Are agencies right when they are wrong? The question answers it-
self. They are not. If the question is rephrased: are agencies right when
courts think they are wrong, the answer becomes perhaps. The an-
swer to the rephrased question is hedged because an agency's determi-
nation of the legal rightness of its own decision will depend upon the
answer to two subsidiary questions: (1) has Congress spoken clearly to
the precise issue? and (2) if not, is the agency's interpretation permissi-
ble within the scope of authority conferred on the agency?
If Congress has spoken, the judiciary is necessarily the final author-
ity on issues of statutory construction and must reject administrative
constructions which are contrary to clear congressional intent.' How-
ever, if Congress has legislated in a manner which, on the given point,
is silent or ambiguous, then the Supreme Court has ruled, in Chevron
U.S.A., Inc v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,2 a court must
not substitute its policy judgment for the permissible construction of
the agency.8
It will be argued here that the deference required of a court, where
Congress has left interpretative responsibility to an agency, is not de-
rived from agency expertise or the inability of a court to muster ade-
quate scientific or technical evidence in favor of its choices,4 although
both factors are frequently present, but a coalescing of the separation
of powers and the judicial acceptance of broad legislative delegations to
the executive. This argument posits that it is analytically inconsistent
and contrary to the assignment of political responsibility within our
* Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice;
Professor of Law (on leave), University of Notre Dame. The views expressed are those
of the author and not necessarily those of the Department of Justice.
1. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). See generally Monaghan,
Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1983) (discussing scope
of judicial power to invalidate acts of Congress).
2. 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984).
3. Id. at 843.
4. See 5 K.C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 29.16, at 402 (2d ed.
1984) (discussing court's deference for agency's interpretation of law).