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72 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 113 (2017-2018)
Exit vs. Voice: A Comparison of Divestment and Shareholder Engagement

handle is hein.journals/annam72 and id is 125 raw text is: 





     EXIT VS. VOICE: A COMPARISON OF
     DIVESTMENT AND SHAREHOLDER
                     ENGAGEMENT

                       ALEX  GORMAN*


Introduction ....    ....................................... 114
    I. Background     ..................................   116
       A. The  Rise of Anti-Corporate Activism ............ 116
       B. Introducing Anti-Corporate Activist Tactics ...... 119
           1. Audience: Activist Tactics Depend on the
              Intended Audience  ...................... 119
          2.  Scale    .................................   121
       C. Audiences  for Shareholder Campaigns ..........  122
       D. Exit and Voice Framework  .   ................... 124
   II. Divestment        ................................... 125
       A. Goals     ....................................   126
       B. Distinction from Socially Responsible Investing .. 128
       C. Distinction from Disinvestment ................  130
  III. Engagem ent ......................................... 132
       A . G oals ............................................  133
       B. Methods     ..................................   133
           1. Shareholder Voting Power  .................. 133
           2. Shareholder Resolutions ..................... 134
           3. Shareholder Meetings .................... 137
           4. General Engagement  ..................... 139
       C. Distinction from Shareholder Activism .......... 140
  IV.  Analysis..    ...................................   142
       A. Costs of Pursuing the Tactic .................... 142
           1. D ivestm ent ..................................  142
           2. Engagement   ..    .......................... 147
           3. Monitoring  Costs ........................   151
       B. Direct Costs Imposed on  Target Company  ....... 152
           1. Direct Costs Imposed by Divestment are
              Attenuated   .............................   153

    * Finance associate at Hogan Lovells in New York. J.D., New York University
School of Law, 2014; B.A., Stanford University, 2004. This Note is dedicated to the
memory of my mother, Jeanette Gorman, my strongest supporter and most
unforgiving editor. Special thanks to Professor Ryan Bubb for his invaluable input
at the early stages of this paper and to the staff of the NYU Annual Survey of
American Law for their excellent editorial contributions. Views expressed herein
are my own.

                              113


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