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1 J.L. Soc'y 91 (1999)
Issue 2

handle is hein.journals/jls1 and id is 97 raw text is: THE USE OF TRAFFIC STOPS AGAINST AFRICAN AMERICANS: WHAT CAN BE DONE? DAVID A. HARRIs* In this article I address an all-too-common experience for African Americans and other people of color: Police use of traffic stops as a pretext to initiate a series of events that often includes questioning and searches. For many years, the bottom line rule in search and seizure law was simple. In order for police to stop a person driving a car or walking down the street, officers needed a reason to suspect that person of involvement in criminal activity. In some situations the stated reason was measured by the probable cause standard;' in others, involving just a temporary detention, the police needed only reasonable suspicion, an amount of evidence less than probable cause but more than just a hunch.2 Whichever standard was used, however, the principle was the same: There had to be some reason to suspect involvement in a crime. An officer's hunch or a gut instinct was not a sufficient legal basis for a stop. This was the law, but the reality on the street was often quite different. Police have long used traffic stops - pulling a driver over for a traffic offense - as a way of stopping people about whom they have no solid reason to suspect any criminal involvement.3 Professor of Law, University of Toledo College of Law. Professor Harris delivered the remarks contained in this article to the Congressional Black Caucus Annual Legislative Conference, Session on African American Issues and the Judiciary, Discrimination in Law Enforcement, September 18, 1998. 1. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)(applying exclusionary rule to states where police violate Fourth Amendment's requirement of probable cause for a search). 2. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)(temporary detention allowed for purposes of investigation, when police have reasonable suspicion to believe that crime may be afoot and that the suspect committed it). 3. See, e.g., LAWRENCE P. TIFFANY ET AL., DETECTION OF CRIME 131-137 (1967) (detailing comments of several police officers discussing how they can easily stop any driver they wish, just by following for a short distance and waiting for an offense to be committed).