About | HeinOnline Law Journal Library | HeinOnline Law Journal Library | HeinOnline

LOG IN
LOG IN


6 Ark. L. Rev. 46 (1951-1952)
The Obstruction of Justice by Interference with a Law Enforcement Officer's Performance of Duty

handle is hein.journals/arklr6 and id is 48 raw text is: The Obstruction of Justice by Interference with a Law Enforcement Officer's Performance of Duty Obstruction of or resistance to a law enforcement officer in the performance of his duties is an offense both at common law and by statute in all jurisdictions.' What constitutes this offense, however, is not always easily ascertainable. The phrase obstructing justice has been defined and interpreted in such diverse ways that unless some authoritative statements about it are read along with the common law rule or statute sought to be applied, the language is practically meaningless. Thus the word obstruct has meant to impede,2 to hinder or prevent from progress,3 to oppose,4 to resist5 or to inter- rupt6 the due course of justice. Statutory definitions are perhaps even more confusing than common law ones, since the legislature in one jurisdiction may select as descriptive of the offense a single word7 which later proves synonymous with a series of two, three, four or more words8 used by another jurisdiction in defining the term, even though a jurisdiction of the latter type frequently includes in its series9 the word solely employed by the former. Although many statutes do not expressly include the word knowingly, scienter ap- pears to be an essential element of the crime of resisting an officer in the performance of his duties.'0 Such statutory companion terms as oppose or resist are generally construed conjunctively, and an indictment charging that defendant did obstruct and resist the exe- cution of process does not allege two distinct and different offenses.'2 'See State v. Hartung, 239 Iowa 414, 30 N.W.2d 491 (1948); Loveless v. Commonwealth, 241 Ky. 82, 43 S.W.2d 348 (1931); People v. Arnett, 239 Mich. 123, 214 N.W. 231 (1927); State v. Wyckoff, 8 N.J. Misc. 149, 149 At. 124 (Sup. Ct. 1930). 'People v. Ormsby, 310 Mich. 291, 17 N.W.2d 187 (1945). 'Bathke v. Mykiebust, 69 S.D. 534, 12 N.W.2d 550 (1944). 'State v. Perry, 109 Iowa 353, 80 N.W. 401 (1899). 'State v. Welch, 37 Wis. 196 (1875). *Lamon v. Gold, 72 W. Va. 618, 79 S.E. 728 (1913). 'E.g., Wis. STAT. § 345..9 (1947) (Any person who shall knowingly resist any officer . . .). 'ARK. STAT. (1947) § 11-2801 (... obstruct or resist . . .); IDAHO CODE § 18-705 (1947) (. . . resists, delays or obstructs . . .); W. VA. CODE § 6015 (1943) (Any person who by threats, menaces, acts or otherwise, shall forcibly or illegally hinder, obstruct, or oppose, or attempt to obstruct or oppose . . .). 'Compare Wisconsin with the Arkansas and Idaho statutes in the two preced- ing notes. State v. Gros, 216 La. 103, 43 So.2d 232 (1949). See Putman v. State, 49 Ark. 449, 5 S.W. 715 (1387) (indictment sufficient if it charged offense sub- stantially in statutory language); People v. Haley, 48 Mich. 495, 12 N.W. 671 (1882) (if one is too drunk to be capable of forming statutory intent, he is free of guilt). Caldwell v. State, 32 Ala. App. 228, 23 So.2d 876 (1945). Slicker v. State, 13 Ark. 397 (1853).