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41 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 133 (2008-2009)
Toward a New Paradigm of Criminal Justice: How the Innocence Movement Mergers Crime Control and Due Process

handle is hein.journals/text41 and id is 141 raw text is: TOWARD A NEW PARADIGM OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE: HOW THE INNOCENCE MOVEMENT
MERGES CRIME CONTROL AND DUE PROCESS
Keith A. Findley'
I.   THE PRIMACY OF INNOCENCE PROTECTION ...................................... 134
II.  CRIME CONTROL AND DUE PROCESS: COMPETING CRIMINAL
JUSTICE  M ODELS?  ............................................................................. 139
III. INNOCENCE REFORMS AND THE RELIABILITY MODEL: MERGING
CRIME CONTROL AND DUE PROCESS ................................................ 141
IV. THE RELIABILITY MODEL: FOCUSING ON BEST PRACTICES To
PROTECT THE INNOCENT WITHOUT SACRIFICING PUBLIC
SAFETY  .............................................................................................. 147
A.    Improving Eyewitness Identification Evidence ........................ 148
1. Reforming Eyewitness Identification Procedures .............. 149
2. Reforming the Way Eyewitness Evidence Is Received
and  Considered .................................................................. 158
B.    Improving Police Interrogation Practices and Guarding
Against False  Confessions ....................................................... 161
C.    Improving  Forensic Sciences ................................................... 166
D.    Neutralizing False Jailhouse Informant Testimony ................. 169
E.    Improved Defense Counsel ...................................................... 171
V .  C ONCLU SION  ..................................................................................... 172
At least since 1964 when Herbert Packer introduced two competing
models of criminal justice, the Crime Control Model and the Due Process
Model, we have become accustomed to thinking in terms of a conflict
between society's interest in convicting the guilty and the rights of criminal
defendants.' The question posed to this symposium panel, Could we
convict fewer innocents without acquitting too many guilty? is premised
on such a paradigm of competing goals. In this Article, I respond to that
question in two ways. First, I suggest that the question, at least to a large
degree, is the wrong question to ask under our constitutional system.2 Our
constitutional system chooses protecting the innocent as a highest-order
* Clinical Professor, University of Wisconsin Law School; Co-Director, Wisconsin Innocence
Project; B.A., Indiana University, 1981; J.D., Yale Law School, 1985. I am grateful to Gary Wells,
Meredith Ross, and Jacqueline McMutrie for their helpful feedback on a draft of this article.
1. HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMaTs OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 150-73 (1968) [hereinafter
PACKER, CRIMINAL SANCTION]; Herbert L. Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. PA. L.
REV. 1, 2-68 (1964) [hereinafter Packer, Two Models].
2. See discussion infra Part L