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1 Tim Caughley, Transparency in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime 1 (2012)

handle is hein.unl/trnucno0001 and id is 1 raw text is: Transparency in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime January 2012 Tim Caughley Resident Senior Fellow, UNIDIR Introduction Transparency is a principle to which all states should adhere because it helps to reinforce compliance with treaty obligations. The more that is known about the manner of implementation of a state's binding treaty commitments the greater will be the level of international trust in the regime. This is especially important in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) given the nature of the deal that it represents. The act of self-denial of nuclear armaments by the non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) rests strongly-but not exclusively-on the expectation that the nuclear weapon states (NWS) will bring about the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and means of their delivery. I say not exclusively because the NNWS also took the view that in negotiating the NPT the world would be a safer place without nuclear weapons-a sentiment that is shared by NWS but not yet implemented in a sufficiently systematic and progressive manner as the NNWS would like. In any event, at the heart of consummating the continuous call on all sides for strengthening the NPT lies improving the levels of transparency as a window on compliance. A short history of transparency in the NPT The NPT itself has little to say about transparency except in the requirement of article III under which the NNWS are obliged to accept safeguards, negotiated with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), assuring the world that they are not breaching their treaty commitments by diverting nuclear energy from peaceful use to potential hostile use. While the IAEA was empowered to monitor compliance with those article III non-proliferation obligations, there was no equivalent body established to monitor compliance with the NNWS' disarmament commitments under article VI of the Treaty. The pace and nature of this disarmament process was left open for the NWS themselves to determine.1 In the absence of transparent actions by the NWS to carry out their disarmament obligations, pressures have grown with the passage of time for more light to be shed on the efforts and intentions of the nuclear weapons-possessing parties. 1 Paul Meyer, Seeking the Accountability that should ensure the NPT's Permanence, paper submitted to the Pugwash conference, Berlin, 1-4 July 2011, <http://pugwashgroup.ca/events/ documents/2011/NPTAccountBerlinJul2OllPaul%2OMeyer.docx>.