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1999 Tennessee Attorney General Reports and Opinions 1 (1999)

handle is hein.sag/sagtn0151 and id is 1 raw text is: STATE OF TENNESSEE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL SECOND FLOOR CORDELLIlULL BUILDING 425 FIFIT AVENUE NORTH NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE 37243-0488 January 19, 1999 Opinion No. 99-001 Civil Causes of Action Against State Trial Judges OUESTIONS 1. Can a civil cause of action be sustained against a state trial judge who commits acts that constitute intentional violation of constitutional or civil rights, judicial misconduct, or criminal misconduct? 2. What civil recourse is available to a party to a case who has been a victim of such misconduct as stated in the previous question? OPINIONS I. No. The doctrine ofjudicial immunity bars civil actions for money damages against state trial court judges for acts committed in their judicial capacity. The only exceptions are for acts committed in clear absence ofjurisdiction or outside the judge's judicial capacity. 2 Judicial wrongs are open to correction through mechanisms of appellate review. Additionally, a party claiming judicial misconduct may file a complaint with the Court of the Judiciar) which is authorized by law to investigate, hear and determine charges against a judge sufficient to warrant discipline or removal. ANALYSIS I. Judges of general jurisdiction are not liable for their judicial acts, even if those acts were allegedly done maliciously or corruptly. Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 347, 80 U.S. 335. 20 L.Ed. 646 (1872). See also, Afireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11, 112 S.Ct. 286, 288, 116 L.Ed.2d 9 (1991). This is the long-standing doctrine of judicial immunity. The modern justification for the grant of immunity from money danages is to preserve the independence of the judiciary by allowing judges to rule without fear ofrecourse. Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, _, 117 S Ct. 1636, 1643. 137 L.Ed.2d 945 (1997), Barret v. larrington, 130 F.3d 246, 254 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied,