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76 Vand. L. Rev. En Banc 1 (2023)

handle is hein.journals/valewenb76 and id is 1 raw text is: VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW EN BANC RESPONSE Committing to Agency Independence Nicholas Almendares* THE ANTI-REMOVAL GAME One of the enduring challenges in politics is that there is little in the way of binding commitments. It is not as if the president and the Speaker of the House can write an effective contract and it is hard to imagine any court ever enforcing it. A commitment by a political actor is therefore only as good as it is credible-that is, if it is in the interests of the actor to keep it, possibly due to mechanisms put in place to induce just those commitments. All this makes analytical tools like game theory well-suited to understanding politics, especially relationships between the parts of the government. This methodology is quite common in political science and economics, and has been used, in a rough way, by courts as well.' . Associate Professor of Law, Maurer School of Law, Indiana University - Bloomington. I thank David Gamage, Andrew Hammond, Michael Mattioli, for their advice and comments. All errors and omissions are solely my own. I would also like to thank Chris Walker and Aaron Nielson for their encouragement in me setting down my own thoughts about their work. Thanks to Alison Rae and Madelyn Toole and the rest of the Vanderbilt Law Review for their valuable help editing this piece. 1. See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 495-98 (2010); id. at 525-27 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 1