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3 Univ. Chi. Bus. L. Rev. 1 (2023-2024)

handle is hein.journals/usitcobs3 and id is 1 raw text is: Can Machines Commit Crimes Under U.S. Antitrust Laws? Aslihan Asil & Thomas G. Wollmann* Generative artificial intelligence is being rapidly deployed for corporate tasks including pricing. Suppose one of these machines communicates with the pricing manager of a competing firm, proposes to collude, receives assent, and raises price. Is this a crime under U.S. antitrust laws, and, if so, who is liable? Based on the observed behavior of the most widely adopted large language model, we argue that this conduct is imminent, satisfies the requirements for agreement and intent un- der Section 1 of the Sherman Act, and could confer criminal liability to both firms as well as the pricing manager of the competing firm. I. IN T R O D U C T IO N ................................................................................................ . . 2 II. ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LARGE LANGUAGE MODELS ........................... 7 A . B a ck grou n d ................................................................................... . 7 B . C ap ab ilities ................................................................................... . 9 C . B u sin ess U ses .............................................................................. . 12 III. SHERM AN A CT SECTION 1 .......................................................................... . . 13 IV . C O N D U C T ..................................................................................................... . . 1 7 V . A G R E E M E N T ................................................................................................ . . 2 0 A . E x isten ce .................................................................................... . . 2 0 B . C a p a c ity ............................................................................................ 2 2 i. Substance over F orm ................................................................ . 23 ii. P u b lic P olicy ............................................................................ . 2 3 iii. T u rin g ...................................................................................... . 2 4 iv. Contract Law A nalogy ............................................................ 25 V I. C RIM IN A L IN TEN T ...................................................................................... . . 2 7 A . E x isten ce .................................................................................... . . 2 7 B . C a p a c ity ............................................................................................ 2 9 Yale University, PhD in Financial Economics 2024, Yale Law School, J.D. 2021; Associ- ate Professor of Economics and William Ladany Faculty Scholar, University of Chicago Booth School of Business, Faculty Research Fellow, National Bureau of Economic Re- search. This paper benefitted from discussions with Ian Ayres, Matt Backus, Joe Har- rington, Alex MacKay, Fiona Scott Morton, and Paulo Ramos. All errors are the authors' own. Wollmann thanks the William Ladany Research Fund at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business for its generous support. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Econom- ic Research. 1