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73 Syracuse L. Rev. 1 (2023)

handle is hein.journals/syrlr73 and id is 1 raw text is: PROFESSOR ADAM SMITH: HUMAN SENTIMENTS, MORAL IMAGINATION, AND JURISPRUDENCE Chapin Ciminot TABLE OF CONTENTS PROLOGUE ........................................................................................... 2 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................... 3 I. FOUR PILLARS OF THE MORAL IMAGINATION ................................ 8 A. The Start: We Are Inherently Other-Regarding ................ 8 B. Where We Go Wrong: Wanting Approval for the Wrong R easons ........................................................................ 11 C. Our Defense Against Corruption: Development of the M oral Conscience ........................................................ 14 D. The Last Step: From Moral Conscience to General Rules 17 III. MORAL IMAGINATION IN LAW: THE VIRTUE OF JUSTICE ............. 20 A. A Sentimentalist Account of Justice ................................ 20 1. Precursor to Justice: Resentment as a Moral Sentiment ......................................21 2. Injustice: Injury Causing Resentment ....................... 22 3. The Innovation of Justice as a Moral Sentiment.......... 25 B. Justice Operationalized: The Impartial Spectator in Lectures on Jurisprudence ........................................... 28 1. Stages Methodology and Growth of Law ................. 29 2. P rop erty .................................................................... 31 3. Selfishness, Equity, and Come-at-it-able-ness ........ 35 4. C ontract .................................................................... 37 IV. MORAL IMAGINATION IN GOVERNMENT: COME-AT-IT-ABLE- N ESS ..................................................................................... 42 A. What Goal for the State? ................................................ 43 t Professor of Law, Kline School of Law, Drexel University; J.D. University of Chicago (1997). I would like to thank everyone at Kline School of Law, Drexel University, who supported this research throughout all stages of the project. To that end, I would also like to thank the participants of Latin American Conference History of Economic Thought Conference, Panel on Adam Smith (2019), and the University of Edinburgh Legal Theory Festival, Panel on Virtue Ethics (2018), for helpful comments on prior versions of this paper. I would also like to thank Robin Paul Malloy and Jerry Evensky for helpful comments on this draft. Last but certainly not least, my special thanks to the wonderful editors of the Syracuse Law Review.