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25 Pol'y Stud. J. 11 (1997)

handle is hein.journals/plyssjnl25 and id is 1 raw text is: Policy Studies Journal, Vol. 25, No. 1, 1997 (11-26) Reducing Toxic Chemical Releases and Transfers: Explaining Outcomes for a Voluntary Program Laurence J. O'Toole, Jr., Chilik Yu, James Cooley, Gail Cowie, Susan Crow, Terry DeMeo, and Stephanie Herbert Relatively little is known about the possibilities and limitations of voluntary public programs. The so-called 33/50 Program for reducing releases of certain toxic chemicals into the environment provides a useful instance for examination. In an investigation of toxics-reduction outcomes, with states as units of analysis, economic and policy variables help to explain the results. In particular, channels and approaches used in communicating policy intentions are related to outcomes. Voluntary programs can make a difference, but the details of execution, including the extent and nature of field efforts, influence outcomes. Contemporary policymakers and analysts are devoting increased attention to nontraditional instruments for achieving governmental ends. Transfer payments, loans, and loan guarantees are now familiar mechanisms. Similarly, initiatives are under way to contract out the production and provision of goods and services and to encourage public-private partnerships. These efforts are not without dangers, but offer prospects for enhancing efficiency and flexibility (Salamon with Lund, 1989). In a related vein, some studies of government regulation have raised the question of whether the conventional U.S. regulatory style typically has placed excessive emphasis on coercion and has made insufficient efforts to explore the utility of cooperative approaches (Bardach & Kagan, 1982; Vogel, 1986; Wilson, 1985). In these connections, a particularly interesting policy instrument that has received little scholarly attention thus far involves the adoption of truly voluntary-hortatory and noncompulsory- programs. The reference here is to initiatives reliant on voluntary compliance by target groups with the expressed intent of policymakers. Truly voluntary instruments operate without coercive or even incentive-based leverage, relying instead on the impacts of information, encouragement, and moral suasion. Policymakers have addressed the most pressing items on their agenda by using compulsory and incentive-based instruments. However, voluntary public programs, too, have become substantively significant in certain fields, such as energy conservation, nonpoint source agricultural pollution, and HIV prevention. Fragmentary evidence suggests that the effectiveness of such approaches depends widely on the style, informational content, and channel of information and appeal; but a theory of voluntary policy instruments has not yet fully been developed. Understanding the determinants of voluntary program success therefore is a matter of some importance, especially given governments' expanded interest in noncoercive programs and budgetary constraints limiting reliance on direct incentives. This article provides an analysis of one program based on voluntary means to achieve a specific environmental policy objective: the 33/50 Program for reducing releases and transfers of certain toxic chemicals by U.S. business manufacturing firms. Through such an analysis, preliminary theoretical ideas 11