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87 Mont. L. Rev. 1 (2026)

handle is hein.journals/montlr87 and id is 1 raw text is: JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AS A CONSTITUTIONAL COMMITMENT IN MONTANA John Carr* The complete independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly essential in a limited Constitution.' I. INTRODUCTION From the founding period onward, the idea that executive and legislative power must be checked by an impartial judiciary has been understood as a key feature of American constitutionalism? Judicial independence allows courts to administer the law steadily and independent of shifting political preferences and priorities.3 In Montana, recent developments have brought renewed attention to the role of the judiciary and the structural arrangements intended to preserve its neutrality.4 As a result, Montanans in the statehouse and on the bench face a heightened burden of constitutional responsibility. Central to this responsibility is maintaining a judiciary capable of serving as a stabilizing institution. That task has become more difficult in a period marked by polarization and uncertainty about the boundaries of legislative power and judicial independence. This Foreword examines how Montana's constitutional designhas historically sought to preserve judicialindependence, and whether those same institutional choices remain effective in a markedly different political climate. Montana's courts have long been understood as one of the state's foremost institutional safeguards.5 Since the adoption of the 1972 Constitution, the state has relied on a non-partisan election system, a mixed-membership judicial discipline commission, and multiple bipartisan structural checks to promote * John Carr, J.D. Candidate, Alexander Blewett III School of Law at the University of Montana, Class of 2026. 1. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 381 (Alexander Hamilton). 2. Id. (discussing structural protections for judicial independence). 3. See David Boies, Judicial Independence and the Rule of Law, 22 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 57, 58 (2006). 4. See Anna Conley, Preliminary Injunctions and the 2025 Montana Legislature's (Mostly Unsuccessful) Attempt to Reshape the Judiciary, 87 MONT. L. REV. 135 (2026); Jonathon Ambarian, Supporters Ask Montana Supreme Court to Revive Political Spending Ballot Measure, KTVH (Nov. 6, 2025), https://perma.cc/65SS-7B28. 5. See MONT. CONST. art. III, §§ 1, 3; id. art. VII, §§ 1-2; see also 3 MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION VERBATIM TRANSCRIPT 3 (1971) (statement of Gov. Forrest H. Anderson) (describing the Constitution's role in structuring government and protecting individual rights).