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42 J. Value Inquiry 1 (2008)

handle is hein.journals/jrnlvi42 and id is 1 raw text is: The Journal of Value Inquiry (2008) 42:1-21 © Springer 2008 DOI 10.1007/s10790-008-9103-2 Obligations of Nearness FRANCESCO ORSI'2 'Scuola Normale Superiore, Pisa, Italy; e-mail: f.orsi@sns.it; 244 Via della Giuliana, 00195, Rome, Italy 1. Introduction Frances M. Kamm has argued that physical distance is, sometimes, relevant per se to our duty to give aid to strangers.' She has thus responded to views such as those of Peter Singer and Peter Unger, who both argued that distance cannot be a morally relevant factor to our duties to prevent suffering, and that therefore there is no moral difference, insofar as distance is considered, between not saving the life of a child nearby and not contributing to charities that would save the life of a child in a distant country.2 If not saving the nearby child is wrong, then not making the charitable contribution must be wrong too, whatever the distance. Physical distance is but one factor, and perhaps not a major factor, in explaining our reluctance to equate not contributing to charities and letting a child die nearby. Whatever the importance of distance for the larger issue of what we owe to needy, distant people, Kamm has the merit of focusing the question of distance per se, by presenting examples so devised as to test our moral intuitions, and by providing a theoretical justification for the view that the distance of needy people, sometimes, morally matters per se in a way that makes taking care of what is near a specific moral duty. Nevertheless, Kamm has not succeeded in her attempt. 2. The Intuitive Relevance of Distance The question whether distance matters is, for Kamm, the question whe- ther distance per se is ever morally relevant, in any context where there may be a duty to aid strangers. The relevant distance is to be meant as not only holding between an agent and a stranger, but also in a variety of cases: when the agent is near a threat to a distant stranger, when the agent's means of aiding are near a distant stranger, when the agent's