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36 J. Value Inquiry 1 (2002)

handle is hein.journals/jrnlvi36 and id is 1 raw text is: MI The Journal of Value Inquiry 36: 1-8, 2002. 1 O © 2002 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands. EDITORIAL Vulnerability, Global Authority, and Moving Away from a Local Maximum of Value THOMAS MAGNELL Editor-in-Chief Since the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, pundits have proclaimed with near unanimity: Everything changed on September 11th. The refrain has been repeated so freely that it has gained wide acceptance as an unarguable truth. As it is, the assertion has been left largely unargued. No doubt it is hyperbole: everything has not changed. It is not clear that it could or that it would even be coherent to say that it could. But like much hyperbole, the overstatement is not without a point, in this case a point about responding to the attacks and to a perceived threat of future attacks. The attacks provoked a sharp military response, while the perceived threat generated a general doctrine to retaliate against terrorists, wherever they may be, and all who harbor terrorists. The military response, which required the invasion of a sovereign state, was carried out without a declaration of war. The general doctrine, perhaps to become known as the Bush Doctrine, placed no limits on future military incursions anywhere in the world, with or without a declaration of war. Throughout most of the world, the military response was favorably received. Certainly in the United States, it was widely popular. The general doctrine garnered much less notice anywhere than might have been expected. If criticism of the doctrine was surprisingly muted outside the United States, it went largely undiscussed by Americans, though their silence was clearly an indication of tacit approval. The rapid adoption of a military posture by the United States can un- doubtedly be described as a change of some moment, one that might even be wrong to second guess. Military action was advocated on grounds of self- defense, and without any serious alternatives, only a pacifist or a fool would fail to see that as aprimafacie reason to engage the military. Self-defense, a basis for behavior rooted in prudence, carries moral weight for con- sequentialists and deontologists alike, whether it concerns individuals or nation states. Indeed, matters of self-defense are arguably the first duties of governments, however many or few other duties might be. The wisdom of