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24 J. Value Inquiry 1 (1990)

handle is hein.journals/jrnlvi24 and id is 1 raw text is: The Journals of Value Inquiry 24: 1-15, 1990. © Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands. Articles Morally privileged relationships * THOMAS DONALDSON Department of Philosophy, Loyola University of Chicago, 6525 N. Sheridan Road, Chicago, IL 70726 A pressing problem is the extent to which, if at all, we should favor fellow citizens, friends, family members and neighbors over non-family members, foreigners, and other global cohabitants. Confronted with the choice of saving the life of one's wife or that of a stranger, few philosophers will advocate flipping a coin;1 but while theorists such as Williams, Parfit, and Oldenquist have referred to the issue of partiality and in some instances taken stands,2 their discussions have left two key questions unanswered: (1) If partiality is sometimes justified, why is it not ex- plainable in terms of traditional, egalitarian moral theory? Are not disinterested reasons - say, about the increased happiness resulting from societal institutions such as the family and friendship - sufficient to explain interested favoritism?; and (2) Are the reasons justifying partiality institution-specific; for example, is partiality towards my children on a par with partiality towards my fellow citizens? In this article I isolate and defend a set of principles for determining the justi- fied range of partiality. Utilizing thought experiments that consider hypothetical worlds devoid of favoritism, I conclude that one is frequently justified in exhibiting partiality to persons even in instances where traditional moral theory espouses impartiality; in turn, I argue for the presence of a non-universalizable value in- herent in personal attachments that escapes traditional analysis. But I also argue that in some instances we are much less justified in exhibiting partiality than many suppose, in particular, to fellow citizens in contrast to foreigners - at least where partiality is defined to exclude hidden considerations of impartial morali- ty. My analysis does not conclude that all national favoritism is bad, since much will find justification through impartial analyses of political and social needs. Nonetheless, it entails a criticism of what might be called pure patriotism. * An earlier version of this paper was read at the University of Chicago Symposium on Social and Political Theory. The paper is indebted to many persons at that Symposium and elsewhere who made helpful criticisms and suggestions, including Gerald Dworkin, John Douard, Russell Hardin, Christine Korsgaard, John Deigh, Alan Gewirth, Jeff Miller, and James Sterba.