About | HeinOnline Law Journal Library | HeinOnline Law Journal Library | HeinOnline

LOG IN
LOG IN


23 J. Value Inquiry 3 (1989)

handle is hein.journals/jrnlvi23 and id is 1 raw text is: The Journal of Value Inquiry 23:3-13 (1989) ©1989 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands Articles Friendship and moral growth MARILYN FRIEDMAN Department of Philosophy, Bowling Green State University, Bowling Green, OH 43403-0222 What does friendship add to our moral lives? Virtue theorists and feminist phi- losophers are among those who have recently given a good deal of philosophical attention to the moral dimension of special relationships, including friendship.' This paper will extend those discussions in a new direction. In the first part, I will consider briefly how commitment to particular persons differs from commitment to abstract moral guidelines, such as principles and rules. Then, I will suggest, in Part 2, that commitments to persons, in particular to our friends, offer us impor- tant possibilities for moral growth and for transformation of the abstract moral guidelines to which we are committed. Finally, in Part 3, as a brief counterpoint, I will reflect on some of the risks involved in relying on our friends to inspire the sort of moral change discussed in the second part of this paper. 1. The nature of commitment to particular persons Relationships vary considerably. We can relate to others in ways which approach equality and mutuality; or we can relate to others in ways which involve forms of dependency or hierarchies of power and authority. The sort of relationship which I shall explore is friendship, that is, a relationship which is based on approximate equality (in at least some respects) and a mutuality of affection, interest, and benevolence.2 Friendship, in this sense, can occur among lovers or familial relations as well as among people not otherwise affiliated with each other. To a greater or lesser extent, one can be friends with one's parents or children, siblings or spouse.' Being a friend to someone involves being committed to them and trusting them. In countless ways, from the trivial to the monumental, friendship invites us to marshal the greater part of the scarce resources of our care, attentiveness, and trust in the selective support of our friends, even though other human beings have similar needs or qualities. This is not equivalent to saying that friends have claims on our personal resources, although I would probably argue that point on another occasion. My suggestion is psychological, rather than morally normative, and