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2 J. Cybersecurity 1 (2016)

handle is hein.journals/jnlocybrs2 and id is 1 raw text is: 





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CYBESEGRIT


Journal of Cybersecurity, 2(1), 2016, 1-2
           doi: 10.1093/cybsec/tyw013
                        Introduction


Introduction


We   are pleased to present this special issue of the Journal of
Cybersecurity, comprising revised papers that first appeared in the
14th Annual  Workshop   on the Economics  of Information Security
(WEIS),  held on the 22-23  June 2015  at the Delft University of
Technology  in the Netherlands. WEIS is the premier venue for pre-
senting interdisciplinary scholarship on cybersecurity. WEIS started
in 2002 at the University of California, Berkeley, organized by lead-
ing researchers from computer  science and economics who  recog-
nized that information security lapses were caused by failures of
incentives more so than failures of technology. Since that time, the
conference has expanded  to include a wide range of social science
perspectives, including psychology, management  science, political
science, and information management.  This naturally complements
the Journal of Cybersecurity's mission to advance the interdisciplin-
ary science of cybersecurity, so we are delighted that the WEIS steer-
ing committee has agreed to publish revised selected papers in the
journal.
   Papers appearing  at WEIS  go through  a rigorous peer review
process, and the papers appearing in this issue went through an add-
itional round of peer review after authors revised their papers fol-
lowing the conference. The eight papers in this issue convey timely
insights into cybersecurity issues.
   The  first three papers study data breaches. The first paper is
Hype   and Heavy  Tails: A  Closer Look  at Data Breaches,  by
Benjamin  Edwards,   Steven Hofmeyr,  and  Stephanie  Forrest. It
received the Best Paper Award,  as selected by the conference at-
tendees. The paper constructs an empirical model of data breach oc-
currence and size. In contrast to conventional wisdom, the authors
demonstrate  that neither the size (in terms of number of records
lost) nor frequency  of occurrence has  increased over  10 years
through  2015.  In  Risky  Business: Fine-grained Data   Breach
Prediction  Using  Business  Profiles, Armin   Sarabi,  Parinaz
Naghizadeh,  Yang  Liu, and  Mingyan  Liu  construct a predictive
model  that can distinguish which organizations are likely to experi-
ence data breaches using features of the organization itself. As a re-
sult, the authors construct risk distributions that are tailored to
particular industrial sectors and vary by threat type. Finally, in The
Economics    of   Mandatory    Security  Breach   Reporting   to
Authorities, Stefan Laube and Rainer Bohme  construct a theoret-
ical model to examine the interactions between firms and regulators
in an environment where  firms are required to disclose breaches to
the regulators, as is the case in the EU. The model predicts that a
combination  of audits and sanctions is necessary in order to incen-
tivize firms to disclose otherwise hidden breaches to regulators.
   The  next two  papers study the decision-making of  businesses
and  security professionals in managing   cybersecurity risk. In


Policy, Statistics, and Questions: Reflections on UK Cyber Security
Disclosures, Chad  Heitzenrater and Andrew  Simpson  perform  a
secondary analysis on survey responses from UK  businesses about
their experiences with security breaches. The authors transform the
survey responses into quantitative metrics of cybersecurity invest-
ment  used in the academic literature, such as expected losses and
benefits. The work takes an important first step toward bridging the
gap between industry surveys of cybersecurity and the methods pro-
posed  by academic  researchers. Meanwhile,  in 'Are Information
Security   Professionals  Expected   Value    Maximisers?:   An
Experimental  and   Survey-based  Test,' Konstantinos  Mersinas,
Bjoern Hartig, Keith M.  Martin, and  Andrew  Seltzer survey and
conduct  experiments  with information  security professionals in
order to assess their risk attitudes. They find that information secur-
ity professionals are just as susceptible to behavioral heuristics and
biases such as framing effects as ordinary individuals. They also find
that the professionals tend to exhibit risk and ambiguity aversion.
   In  Characterizing Fraud  and  Its Ramifications in Affiliate
Marketing  Networks,  Peter Snyder and Chris Kanich describe an
empirical investigation into the prevalence of affiliate marketing
fraud, a  form  of  online  advertising abuse in  which  regular
Internet traffic is unwittingly funneled through a third party who re-
ceives a share of any resulting sales. By examining a large amount
of anonymized   network  traffic data from a  university, the au-
thors devise a technique to automatically detect the frauds and pro-
vide first-of-its-kind measurements on its prevalence. They also
conduct   a  cost-benefit analysis  of  the  fraud  for  affected
stakeholders.
   The  last two papers in the issue are also empirical. Both describe
experiments in which abuse data is shared with Internet operators in
hopes of encouraging  greater investment in security defenses and
cleanup. In Understanding the Role of Sender Reputation in Abuse
Reporting and  Cleanup, Orcun  Cetin, Mohammad Hanif Jhaveri,
Carlos Ganian, Michel van Eeten, and Tyler Moore  describe an ex-
periment in which they emailed abuse reports to the webmaster and
hosting providers of compromised websites. The experiment varied
the sender of the abuse reports between a university, anti-malware
organization, and webmail  address to test the hypothesis that the
perceived reputation of the sender might influence the recipient's
likelihood of taking action. The results found that the sender's email
address did not in fact make any significant difference, though they
did confirm earlier findings that sending notices expedites cleanup
compared  to a control group where no reports were sent. In How
Would  Information Disclosure Influence Organizations' Outbound
Spam  Volume?  Evidence from  a Field Experiment, Shu He, Gene
Moo   Lee,  Sukjin Han,  and  Andrew   B. Whinston   constructed


OThe Author 2016. Published by Oxford University Press.
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