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17 Iustinianus Primus L. Rev. 1 (2026)

handle is hein.journals/iusplr17 and id is 1 raw text is: DARKO SPASEVSKI VILDAN DRPLJANIN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AT THE EDGE OF THE MACHINE A computer can never be held accountable; therefore, a computer must never make a management decision. - IBM slide deck, 1979 - Abstract - The increasing incorporation of algorithms, artificial intelligence, and automated decision- making systems into corporate governance marks a structural transformation in the way corporate authority is exercised. Decision-making processes that were historically grounded in human judgment, deliberation, and fiduciary responsibility are now increasingly mediated by algorithmic systems that shape or determine outcomes in areas such as risk management, compliance, shareholder voting, and capital allocation. While these developments are frequently justified in terms of efficiency, accuracy, and predictive capacity, their implications for corporate law remain insufficiently theorized. This article examines the emergence of what it terms algorithmic corporate actors, i.e. non-human systems that perform governance-relevant functions with legally and economically significant consequences for corporations and their stakeholders. It argues that the rise of such systems generates a black box dilemma for corporate law. On the one hand, algorithmic governance enhances decision-making capacity and oversight. On the other hand, it obscures responsibility, complicates the application of directors' fiduciary duties, and weakens traditional mechanisms of accountability and participation. The article analyses how reliance on opaque algorithmic outputs challenges established doctrines concerning directors' duties of care and oversight, reshapes the exercise of shareholder rights through automated voting and decision-support systems, and strains the capacity of regulators to monitor compliance regimes governed by proprietary code. Drawing on comparative perspectives and regulatory developments, including emerging approaches to algorithmic transparency and auditability, the article evaluates whether existing legal frameworks are adequate or require adaptation. The central claim advanced is that algorithmic corporate governance cannot be understood as a purely technical evolution. It represents a shift in the locus of authority within the firm that compels a reconsideration of core principles of corporate law, including responsibility, transparency, and meaningful participation. The article concludes by outlining normative and institutional safeguards aimed at preserving accountability in corporate governance structures increasingly shaped by code. * Darko Spasevski, PhD., Professor, Ss. Cyril and Methodius University in Skopje, Iustinianus Primus Faculty of Law, ORCID0009-0007-4060-7586, e-mail: d.spasevskidfMuk-im.cdu. Vildan Drpljanin, PhD Candidate, Ss. Cyril and Methodius University in Skopje, Iustinianus Primus Faculty of Law, ORCID 0000-0002-4219-9412