Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions V. 17

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17 Governance: An Int'l J. Pol'y, Admin, & Institutions 1 (2004)

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Feeling the Heat? Anticorruption Mechanisms in
Comparative Perspective

MOSHE MAOR*

This article addresses the implications of political executives losing control
over corruption investigations of senior officeholders following the creation
of anticorruption mechanisms (e.g., commissions, special prosecutors, inde-
pendent counsels, investigating judges). When investigations hit close to
home, the ensuing political fallout makes political executives eager to look
for ways to derail such investigations, especially when investigators
proceed with an uncharted mandate. Against this background, two
hypotheses are investigated: (i) the striking outcome of this process is a con-
certed move by targeted political executives to undermine the credibility of
anticorruption mechanisms and, when deemed necessary, to terminate their
operation, and (ii) the extent to which the prosecutors are successful
depends on both institutions and media accessibility: the more centralized
and fused political power is, and the less media accessible the government
is, the harder it will be to carry out an investigation. These hypotheses are
strongly supported by a comparative analysis of five anticorruption mech-
anisms in the United States, the Soviet Union, Italy, and Australia
(Queensland and New South Wales.)

INTRODUCTION
Public corruption rarely occurs where it may be witnessed.' To uncover
such behavior, political executives (i.e., government ministers, prime
ministers, and presidents) often respond by establishing anticorruption
mechanisms (e.g., commissions, special prosecutors, independent coun-
sels, investigative judges). These mechanisms are entrusted with exten-
sive coercive powers-foremost among them is the power to hold public
hearings at which any person can be summoned to appear and compelled
to answer questions and produce documents or other evidence. This
capacity represents a major leap in criminal investigation strategies and
emphasizes the seriousness of the attempt to maintain the integrity of
public officials. The fight against corruption thus conjures up images of
serious and decisive attempts to root it out.
This article seeks to undermine these images by focusing on the impli-
cations of political executives losing control over investigations of se-
nior officeholders following the creation of anticorruption mechanisms.

*The Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions, Vol. 17, No. 1,
January 2004 (pp. 1-28). © 2004 Blackwell Publishing, 350 Main St., Malden, MA 02148, USA,
and 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford, OX4 2DQ, UK. ISSN 0952-1895