Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions V. 14

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14 Governance: An Int'l J. Pol'y, Admin, & Institutions 1 (2001)

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The Auditing of Public Policy and the Politics of
Auditing: The U.S. GAO and Israel's
State Comptroller

PATRICK G. GRASSO* AND IRA SHARKANSKY**

A purist conception of audit independence appears to be obsolete. A sur-
vey of audit activities of the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) and
Israel's State Comptroller describes pressures on audit bodies to examine
sensitive policy issues and to enter partisan and personal squabbles
between elected officials. The critique of the GAO by the National Acad-
emy of Public Administration recommends that legislators refrain from
asking the audit body to deal with politically sensitive issues. In order to
salvage somethingfrom the principle of audit independence, it appears
more realistic to urge diligence on the part of the supreme auditor.

This paper examines the issue of auditing and politics in the context of
two supreme national audit bodies. They are chosen not because they are
typical (it is hard to argue that any given audit agency is typical), or
because they are similar. Indeed, they exist in regimes that differ greatly
in their constitutional structure and political traditions. What links the
audit bodies is that each, in its own way, has expanded the nature of gov-
ernment auditing in ways that carry import for all such organizations,
and the fact that the coauthors know them especially well due to their
involvement with them as researchers and practitioners. Lessons drawn
from the experience of these audit organizations may prove instructive
not only to them but to other audit agencies that find themselves pressed
to more directly involve themselves in policy or political audits. Yet addi-
tional lessons have relevance for political scientists concerned with state
auditing.
We conclude that a purist view of audit independence is untenable in a
situation in which the consumers as well as the producers of audit reports
seek to inquire into activities that are inherently sensitive and political.
The audit bodies examined are already well equipped with institutional
protections against political interference; further strengthening of

*The World Bank. Patrick G. Grasso has served previously as Assistant Director in the Pro-
gram Evaluation and Methodology Division of the U.S. General Accounting Office.
**The Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Ira Sharkansky has been a member of the Research
Committee of the Israel State Comptroller. This article represents the analysis and conclusions
of the authors, and not the views of either national audit body.
Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration, Vol. 14, No. 1, January 2001
(pp. 1-21). @ 2001 Blackwell Publishers, 350 Main St., Malden MA 02148, USA, and 108
Cowley Road, Oxford, OX4 1JF, UK. ISSN 0952-1895