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27 Global Governance 1 (2021)

handle is hein.journals/glogo27 and id is 1 raw text is: GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 27 (2021) 1-24 G BRILL g N IJ H O F F brillcom/gg Beyond the Veto Roles in UN Security Council Decision-Making Jess Gifkins I ORCID: 0000-0003-0551-787X The University of Manchester, Manchester, United Kingdom jess.gifkins@manchester ac. uk Abstract The formal rules governing the UN Security Council offer little insight into how nego- tiations are conducted on a day-to-day basis. While it is generally assumed that perma- nent members dominate negotiations, this article investigates avenues for influence for elected members and the UN Secretariat. Institutional power is used to show how per- manent members adopt dominant positions in negotiations extending farbeyond their Charter-given privileges. Dominance of permanent members is moderated, however, by the legitimacy that support from elected members brings to a resolution. Similarly, the UN Secretariat can use its legitimated authority to influence decisions. The arti- cle argues that informal practices are key in understanding how power and influence are allocated in the Council and it forms a building block for future analyses of Secu- rity Council practices. This argument also has implications for the perennial reform debates and the prospects for informal reform. Keywords Security Council - decision-making - influence - legitimacy - institutional power - practices © JESS GIFKINS, 2021 I DOI:10.1163/19426720-02701003 This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the CC BY 4.0 license.